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1 
 Executive summary 
Introduction 
• Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have proposed introducing a pupil 
premium in England, with the aim of narrowing the achievement gap between rich 
and poor by attaching greater levels of funding to pupils from disadvantaged 
backgrounds.  
• The idea of a pupil premium is to provide a fixed extra amount to state schools for 
each pupil from a disadvantaged background they admit each year. The current 
system already weights pupil funding towards deprivation to some extent. The 
proposals for a pupil premium would simplify this system, could weight funding 
even more towards disadvantage and make changes in a school’s funding levels 
much more immediate as intakes change over time.  
• Such a reform would mark a significant change to school funding and, without 
additional money from the public purse, risks creating winners and losers. At a time 
of fiscal restraint, it is essential that any such reform is grounded in both theory and 
evidence.  
School funding in England 
• Total school spending in England amounted to £47.5 billion in 2008–09 (in 2010 
prices). Day-to-day spending per pupil has grown by an average of 4.8% per year in 
real terms since Labour came to power in 1997. 
• Schools currently receive their funding through two main sources: local authorities’ 
‘fair-funding’ formulae and specific grants from central government.  
• Per-pupil funding varies widely between schools in England. Much of this variation 
arises because the current system weights funding towards schools with more 
deprived intakes. For example, the implied additional income that schools receive 
for each pupil eligible for free school meals (FSM) comes to approximately £2,460 in 
the case of primary schools and about £3,370 for secondary schools. A 
disproportionate share of these implicit ‘FSM premiums’ results from specific grants 
made by central government, which serve to make the school funding system more 
redistributive than it otherwise would be. This is particularly true for secondary 
schools, thereby making deprived secondary schools highly dependent on specific 
grants. 
• The level of funding targeted at deprivation has increased rapidly in recent years, 
particularly in terms of funds provided by local authorities. Local authorities still 
seem to ‘flatten’ the funding they receive on the basis of deprivation, spreading it 
across all pupils instead, but the level of such flattening has reduced. However, the 
system remains relatively unresponsive to changing needs from year to year. 
• Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have proposed the introduction 
of a pupil premium. This would provide a fixed amount to schools for each pupil 
enrolled from a disadvantaged background. A pupil premium aims to increase the 
level of resources targeted at pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds and reduce 
any disincentives that affluent schools might have to attract hard-to-teach pupils. 
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Theory and empirical evidence 
• The pupil premium could narrow the achievement gap between advantaged and 
disadvantaged pupils through a number of mechanisms: the direct effect of extra 
resources; the indirect effect of changes to pupils’ peer group; or the indirect effect 
of the creation of new schools.  
• The conventional wisdom surrounding the impact of increasing school resources on 
pupil attainment is that ‘there is not a strong or consistent relationship between 
student performance and school resources’. Recent academic literature for the UK 
has provided some evidence of resource effects, however, though they are generally 
small in magnitude. There is some suggestion that extra resources for disadvantaged 
pupils would reduce the attainment gap, although this will depend on how those 
resources are used by schools.  
• Schools are unlikely to actively recruit more disadvantaged pupils as a result of the 
pupil premium: the premium would need to be very high to sufficiently reduce the 
disincentive for schools to attract such pupils, and schools’ ability to select pupils is 
also limited to some extent by the School Admissions Code. The pupil premium may 
lead to a small reduction in covert selection by schools but is unlikely to significantly 
reduce social segregation.  
• New schools may be established primarily in disadvantaged areas, although, without 
a ‘for-profit’ incentive, it is unlikely that the UK would see the same level of 
expansion that other countries have seen. We also find that an increase in the 
number of schools may lead to an increase in the level of segregation between 
schools, but this may not be detrimental to disadvantaged pupils. Several chains of 
schools in the US specialise in teaching pupils in disadvantaged areas and have 
reported significant gains in attainment.  
Empirical analysis of policy options 
• We simulate a number of options for the pupil premium and then examine their 
likely impact on school finances. The results show the impact on the amount of 
‘progressivity’ in the school funding system (i.e. the weighting of funding towards 
school-level measures of deprivation) and they document the range of winners and 
losers compared with the current system.  
• The policy options are grouped together according to whether they (1) supplement 
the existing system, (2) replace specific grants or (3) replace the entire system.  
• The options in the first category approximate current Liberal Democrat policy. Out 
of the options we consider, these reforms financially benefit schools the most and 
increase progressivity. However, funding must be found from other sources: the 
Liberal Democrats have proposed cutting tax credits to above-average-income 
families, as well as other areas of spending.  
• The second group of options replace specific grants from central government with a 
pupil premium. These options have a lower net cost and can be revenue-neutral, but 
at the same time they have the potential to create a vast number of significant 
losers.  
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• We also consider the implementation of a single national funding formula, a 
seemingly radical option. However, the number of significant losers from 
implementing such a system could actually be much lower than through replacing 
specific grants alone.  
• More detailed analysis of a national funding formula illustrates a key problem with 
such a reform: the concentration of gains and losses across particular local 
authorities. This pattern does not appear to simply follow an urban/rural split; 
instead, it is likely to reflect local authority choices over central services, 
prioritisation of primary or secondary schools and historical factors.  
• To ease any transition to this sort of funding system, interim mechanisms that 
truncate large potential losses (and gains) could be imposed. The cost of such 
measures would be small relative to the total schools budget. For example, imposing 
a floor of 5% on schools’ annual real-terms losses and a ceiling of 15% on increases 
would enable one of the options to be phased in over five years, at an additional 
cost of £75 million per year (2010 prices). However, real-terms cuts of 5% are still 
likely to be painful for any school facing them; schools have become used to real-
terms increases. The only way to reduce such losses is through a permanent increase 
in school funding.  
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1. Introduction 
All the main political parties have expressed a desire to narrow the achievement gap 
between rich and poor children and to promote social mobility. The Department for 
Children, Schools and Families lists ‘Clos[ing] the gap in educational achievement for 
children from disadvantaged backgrounds’ as one of its main strategic objectives.1 
Meanwhile, the Conservative Party’s draft 2010 general election manifesto for schools 
states that ‘we will improve standards for all pupils and close the attainment gap between 
the richest and poorest’.2 In a recent speech, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick 
Clegg MP, said that ‘Countless young boys and girls are falling behind at school not 
because of a lack of potential, but because of the circumstances of their birth’.3 
Achievement gaps between rich and poor can be seen from a very early age and continue 
to widen as children get older. By the time children take their GCSEs at age 16, there is a 
significant achievement gap between rich and poor. As Figure 1.1 shows, in 2008, less 
than a quarter of children eligible for free school meals (FSM) achieved five good GCSEs 
(A*–C) inclusive of English and Maths. This compares with just over half of all children 
from higher-income families (not eligible for free school meals). However, this gap has 
narrowed in relative terms in recent years, as shown by the black line in Figure 1.1. In 
2008, children eligible for FSM were half as likely to achieve this benchmark as children 
who were not eligible, yet in 2003 they were only a third as likely to do so. Nevertheless, 
the current achievement gap is large and makes a significant contribution to later-life 
income and earnings inequalities, and could potentially be passed on to future 
generations. 
Figure 1.1. Percentage of children achieving 5+ GCSEs at A*–C (including 
English and Maths) by FSM eligibility 
 
Sources: 2003–04 to 2007–08 – Department for Children, Schools and Families (2009a); 2008–09 – 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (2009b). 
                                                                  
1http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/dsoindicators/downloads/DSO-Indicators-March2009.pdf. 
2http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2010/01/~/media/Files/Draft%20Manifesto/DraftSchool
sManifesto.ashx, page 4. 
3‘Four steps to a fairer Britain says Nick Clegg’, 11 January 2010, 
http://www.libdems.org.uk/speeches_detail.aspx?title=Four_steps_to_a_Fairer_Britain_says_Nick_Clegg&pP
K=800fa58c-5bc9-45d3-8b58-32b93d5c2e96. 
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Various policy proposals have been put forward to reduce this gap, including: greater 
levels of early years provision; increased numbers of health visitors; greater levels of one-
on-one tuition in reading and Maths; opening up the state sector to provision by non-
state providers; incentives for good teachers to work in deprived schools; mentoring 
schemes; and programmes to raise the aspirations of young children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds.  
One proposal put forward by both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats is the 
introduction of a disadvantaged pupil premium into the school funding system in 
England. These proposals are highly likely to form part of their manifesto commitments 
for the upcoming 2010 general election.4 
The idea of a pupil premium is to provide a fixed extra amount to state schools for each 
pupil they admit from a disadvantaged background. The current system of school funding 
in England does effectively already provide extra funding for schools with more pupils 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. However, the system is complex and rather slow to 
respond to year-on-year changes in a school’s intake, with a large amount of funding 
apparently dependent on historical rather than current deprivation.5 The proposals for a 
pupil premium would not only simplify this system, but could also weight funding even 
more towards disadvantage and make changes in a school’s funding levels much more 
immediate as intakes change over time.  
Such a reform, if implemented, would therefore mark a significant change to the way 
schools are funded in England. It is thus essential that any such reform is grounded in 
both theory and empirical evidence. This Commentary aims to provide a rigorous and 
impartial analysis of the theory behind a pupil premium, together with a comprehensive 
empirical analysis of how a pupil premium would operate in practice and how it would 
affect school finances. 
The rest of this Commentary is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides some 
background information on the current system of school funding, its key characteristics 
and the proposals for a pupil premium currently being put forward. Chapter 3 reviews 
the theory of the pupil premium and the channels through which the pupil premium may 
affect the attainment of disadvantaged pupils, drawing on relevant literature and 
empirical evidence. Chapter 4 then examines the empirical options for a pupil premium, 
tying these closely to the proposals put forward by the Liberal Democrats as well as 
recent proposals made by Policy Exchange.6 We examine the extent to which the pupil 
premium could increase or decrease the targeting of resources at disadvantaged pupils 
and how many schools would win or lose from these proposals. We also consider some 
issues that might be likely to arise with the introduction of a single national funding 
formula, a long-term aspiration of the Conservative Party. Chapter 5 concludes.  
 
                                                                  
4See the draft schools chapter of the Conservatives’ 2010 general election manifesto and the speech by Nick 
Clegg on 11 January 2010, both cited earlier.  
5See Chowdry, Muriel and Sibieta (2008). 
6See Freedman and Horner (2008). 
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2. School funding in England 
Key findings 
• Total school spending in England amounted to £47.5 billion in 2008–09 (in 2010 
prices). Day-to-day spending per pupil has grown by an average of 4.8% per year in 
real terms since Labour came to power in 1997. 
• Schools currently receive their funding through two main sources: local authorities’ 
‘fair-funding’ formulae and specific grants from central government.  
• There is a great deal of variation in per-pupil funding between schools in England. 
Much of this variation arises because the current system weights funding towards 
schools with more deprived intakes. For example, the implied additional income 
that schools receive for each pupil eligible for free school meals (FSM) comes to 
approximately £2,460 in the case of primary schools and about £3,370 for 
secondary schools. A disproportionate share of these implicit ‘FSM premiums’ 
results from specific grants made by central government, which serve to make the 
school funding system more redistributive than it otherwise would be. This is 
particularly true for secondary schools, thereby making deprived secondary schools 
highly dependent on specific grants. 
• The level of funding targeted at deprivation has increased rapidly in recent years, 
particularly in terms of funds provided by local authorities. Local authorities still 
seem to ‘flatten’ the funding they receive on the basis of deprivation, spreading it 
across all pupils instead, but the level of such flattening has reduced. However, the 
system remains relatively unresponsive to changing needs from year to year. 
• Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have proposed the introduction 
of a pupil premium. This would provide a fixed amount to schools for each pupil 
enrolled from a disadvantaged background. A pupil premium aims to increase the 
level of resources targeted at pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds and reduce 
any disincentives that affluent schools might have to attract hard-to-teach pupils. 
 
The introduction of a pupil premium would mark a significant reform to the current 
school funding system in England. However, before we can examine the theory behind a 
pupil premium or analyse its potential effects on school finances, it is important to 
understand how the current system works. This will allow us to examine how a pupil 
premium could work in practice, and how it could change the system of school funding in 
England. This chapter begins by briefly examining recent trends in schools spending 
(Section 2.1). It goes on to explain how the current system of school funding in England 
works (Section 2.2) and then outlines some of its key characteristics and how it has 
changed in recent years (Section 2.3). The chapter concludes by discussing proposals for 
a pupil premium and how they could change the system of school funding in England 
(Section 2.4).  
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2.1 Schools spending in England 
In 2008–09, it is estimated that school spending reached £47.5 billion (expressed in 2010 
prices). As Figure 2.1 shows, about 12% of this total represents capital expenditure (for 
example, rebuilding or refurbishing school buildings). The remaining 88% represents 
current or day-to-day expenditure (for example, teachers’ pay, textbooks, stationery and 
other consumables). About 28% is spent on primary schools and another 39% on 
secondary schools; 10% covers expenditure on the under-5s, with the final 11% covering 
other expenditure (including expenditure on city academies and teacher training). 
Figure 2.2 shows the level of current spending per pupil (i.e. excluding capital spending) 
between 1997–98 and 2010–11, expressed in 2010 prices. This measure of spending per 
pupil is expected to reach £5,580 by 2010–11. If delivered, this would represent an 
annual average growth rate of 4.8% per year in real terms since Labour came to power in 
1997. The growth rate would be even higher, at 5.8% per year, if we included capital 
spending.  
Figure 2.1. Composition of schools spending in England, 2008–09 
 
Source: Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009b.  
Figure 2.2. Evolution of current school spending per pupil in England  
 
Sources: Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009b. ONS and HM Treasury for deflators. 
Capital
12%
Under-5s
10%
Primary
28%
Secondary
39%
Other
11%Total school spending 
in 2008–09: 
£47.5 billion
(2010 prices)
£0
£1,000
£2,000
£3,000
£4,000
£5,000
£6,000
1997–98 1999–2000 2001–02 2003–04 2005–06 2007–08 2009–10
Sp
en
di
ng
 p
er
 p
up
il 
(2
01
0 
pr
ic
es
) Average growth 1997–98 to 2010–11: 4.8%
The pupil premium: assessing the options 
8 
2.2 How does the school funding system work? 
Per-pupil funding of £5,580 in 2010–11 will not be allocated to all schools in England as a 
fixed per-pupil amount in 2010–11. The school funding system is significantly more 
complicated and is described in detail in Chowdry, Muriel and Sibieta (2008). Here, we 
provide a brief summary, which is illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3. The school funding process: local authorities to schools 
 
 
Schools in England receive almost all their funding via local authorities, though local 
authorities do not control all of this money. Each year, local authorities receive an 
allocation from central government called the Dedicated Schools Grant (introduced in 
2006–07). This is calculated based on pupil numbers, the allocation the local authority 
received the previous year and other factors to reflect ministerial priorities (such as the 
number of pupils eligible for free school meals or with low prior attainment). This 
allocation is ‘ring-fenced’, meaning that it must be spent on pupil provision in support of 
local authorities’ ‘Schools Budget’. However, local authorities are free to add to this 
money from other sources, such as grants that are not ring-fenced, council tax revenues 
and local charges for council services.  
Some of this Schools Budget is spent on central services provided by the local authority, 
such as high-cost special educational needs, transport, education psychology services and 
school admissions. The amount that is held centrally varies by local authority. In 2008–
09, local authorities spent, on average, 12% of their Schools Budget on these central 
Local authority Schools Budget 
Covers all pupil provision.  
Funding comes from ring-fenced grants from central 
government, to which local authorities can add. 
Individual Schools Budget 
(ISB) 
Money to be allocated to 
individual schools via local 
‘fair-funding’ formula. 
Central services 
Money held back by the local 
authority to pay for pupil 
services such as high-cost 
special educational needs and 
Pupil Referral Units. 
Funds allocated to an 
individual school 
From both ‘fair-funding’ 
formula and specific grants. 
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services. However, about one in ten local authorities spent more than 16% of their 
Schools Budget on central services, and one in ten spent less than 9%.7  
The rest of the Schools Budget is then allocated to schools using a local authority’s ‘fair-
funding’ formula. This is intended to ensure that schools within a local authority that 
have similar characteristics receive the same level of per-pupil funding. These formulae 
vary by local authority, but the most common elements determining schools’ funding are: 
• the number of pupils in each Key Stage; 
• indicators of social deprivation (e.g. number of pupils eligible for free school meals); 
• number of pupils with a statement of special educational needs (SEN); 
• number of pupils with SEN without a statement; 
• number of pupils with English as an additional language; 
• site and school factors (e.g. business rates bill, or an amount per square metre). 
The amount provided through these fair-funding formulae represents the largest single 
source of each individual school’s funding. However, over the past decade, schools have 
increasingly received funding via another source: specific grants from central 
government. These are calculated using formulae determined by central government. 
Local authorities have no say over how they are allocated. Instead, they must be passed 
on in full directly into schools’ bank accounts. Examples of specific grants include the 
School Standards Grant, School Development Grant and other Standards Fund grants.  
Figure 2.4 shows the proportion of (a) primary and (b) secondary schools’ funding that 
came from formula funding (i.e. via local authorities’ fair-funding formulae) and the 
proportion that came from specific grants for years from 2005–06 to 2008–09. In 2008–
09, primary schools received about 15% of their funding from specific grants, a figure 
that has not changed much since 2005–06. Similarly, secondary schools received about 
16% of their funding from specific grants in 2008–09, but, in contrast to primary schools, 
this figure has fallen over time from about 20% in 2005–06.  
Figure 2.4a. Composition of primary school funding over time 
 
Sources: School financial data – based on Section 52 outturn data. Pupil- and school-level characteristics – 
taken from the National Pupil Database (NPD), Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) and EduBase. ONS 
and HM Treasury for deflators. 
                                                                  
7Authors’ calculations using Section 52 data – publicly-available financial data on schools’ individual levels of 
funding and expenditure. 
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Figure 2.4b. Composition of secondary school funding over time 
 
Sources: School financial data – based on Section 52 outturn data. Pupil- and school-level characteristics – 
taken from the National Pupil Database (NPD), Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) and EduBase. ONS 
and HM Treasury for deflators. 
2.3 Key characteristics and changes 
As outlined above, schools receive funding from two broad sources: their local authority’s 
fair-funding formula; and specific grants determined by central government. In this 
section, we examine the key characteristics of the present system, as well as changes in 
recent years and current government proposals for further changes.  
Variation in funding 
The operation of fair-funding formulae and differences in pupil characteristics across 
schools create quite a wide range of funding per pupil across schools in England. Figure 
2.5 plots the distribution of per-pupil funding in 2008–09 for primary schools (dashed 
line) and secondary schools (solid line), expressed in 2010 prices.  
Figure 2.5. Distribution of funding per pupil in 2008–09 
 
Source: School financial data – based on Section 52 outturn data. 
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Both distributions exhibit a wide amount of dispersion, with primary funding per pupil 
varying between around £3,000 and £6,000, while secondary funding per pupil varies 
between £4,000 and £7,000 or so. A small number of schools exhibit funding levels 
outside these amounts. The fact that the distribution for secondary schools is further to 
the right indicates that they generally receive more funding per pupil: £5,050 on average 
versus £4,050 for primary schools. 
Increases in deprivation funding 
In our previous report on school funding (Chowdry, Muriel and Sibieta, 2008), we 
analysed which pupil characteristics (implicitly) explain the largest proportions of 
schools’ funding. We found that funding was highly skewed towards schools with greater 
numbers of pupils with special educational needs (particularly if those pupils have a 
statement8) and towards schools with a greater number of pupils from deprived 
backgrounds. Here, we repeat some of this analysis for the most recent financial year, 
2008–09.  
We use regression techniques to isolate the impact of various school-level characteristics 
on a school’s overall level of funding in any particular year, whilst holding other 
characteristics constant (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for full results for 2008–09). For 
instance, we ask how much higher the level of funding is, on average, in schools with an 
extra child eligible for free school meals, holding other school-level characteristics 
constant. We refer to this example throughout the Commentary as the implicit FSM 
premium and use it as a measure of the level of targeting towards disadvantage present 
in the current school funding system. However, it is important to note that this 
methodology only gives us the implicit formula used by local authorities rather than their 
explicit or actual formulae. Explicit formulae are more complex than the implicit formulae 
we estimate, as they use other measures of disadvantage and factors that we cannot 
control for (for example, the number of children in care). The standardisation and 
simplification of the present system is one aim of the pupil premium. Indeed, one option 
for a pupil premium could simply create an explicit FSM premium.  
Noting this, Figure 2.6 shows that, in 2008–09, primary schools received, on average, an 
implicit FSM premium of £2,460 for each pupil eligible for free school meals, whilst 
secondary schools received an extra £3,370 (in 2010 prices). These amounts are on top of 
any base amount provided for all other pupils. This implicit FSM premium has grown in 
recent years for both primary and secondary schools, as is also shown in Figure 2.6. It has 
grown by a total real-terms amount of 69% for primary schools and by a total of 53% for 
secondary schools over the period 2005–06 to 2008–09. Both figures take into account 
the effects of inflation and are well in excess of the 17% real-terms growth in total per-
pupil spending that could be observed earlier in Figure 2.2. The growth in this implicit 
FSM premium in the last few years has thus been very large indeed, and suggests the 
school funding system has become much more redistributive. It is also worth noting that 
the growth in primary schools’ implicit FSM premium was particularly large in 2007–08: 
it grew from £1,630 the previous year to £2,260, an increase of 39% in a single year. The 
growth in secondary schools’ implicit FSM premium over the period was more gradual.  
                                                                  
8A statement of special educational needs is co-ordinated between the local authority, parents and the school. 
The statement sets out the level of provision needed for the pupil, and consequently determines how much 
extra funding they require. 
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Figure 2.6. Implicit FSM premium over time  
 
Sources: School financial data – based on Section 52 outturn data. Pupil- and school-level characteristics – 
taken from the National Pupil Database (NPD), Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) and EduBase. ONS 
and HM Treasury for deflators. 
In our previous report, we also showed that a disproportionate share of this implicit FSM 
premium can be accounted for by specific grants from central government. Despite 
representing only 15% of overall primary schools’ budgets over time, they contributed to 
28% of the implicit FSM premium in 2008–09, as is shown in Figure 2.7a. The story is 
even starker for secondary schools (Figure 2.7b). Specific grants represented 16% of 
secondary schools’ budgets in 2008–09, yet contributed 44% of the implicit FSM 
premium. Therefore specific grants seem to have made the school funding system more 
redistributive than it otherwise would have been. However, their contribution to the 
implicit FSM premium has decreased for both primary and secondary schools since 
2005–06.  
Figure 2.7a. Composition of implicit primary FSM premium over time 
 
Sources: School financial data – based on Section 52 outturn data. Pupil- and school-level characteristics – 
taken from the National Pupil Database (NPD), Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) and EduBase. ONS 
and HM Treasury for deflators. 
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Figure 2.7b. Composition of implicit secondary FSM premium over time 
 
Sources: School financial data – based on Section 52 outturn data. Pupil- and school-level characteristics – 
taken from the National Pupil Database (NPD), Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) and EduBase. ONS 
and HM Treasury for deflators. 
Flattening of deprivation funding 
In our previous report, we found that the amounts allocated to schools via local 
authorities’ ‘fair-funding’ formulae are less redistributive than the system used to allocate 
grants to local authorities. In other words, local authorities seem to spread or ‘flatten’ the 
deprivation-led funding that they receive, giving more to all pupils across their area 
rather than just focusing it on deprived pupils. West (2009) examines the formulae used 
by a sample of local authorities and also finds that they allocate less funding on the basis 
of deprivation than they receive from central government, instead spreading the funding 
over all pupils in their area. 
Figure 2.8. Proportion of funds implicitly allocated to local authorities on 
the basis of FSM that was passed on to individual schools 
 
Sources: School financial data – based on Section 52 outturn data. Pupil- and school-level characteristics – 
taken from the National Pupil Database (NPD), Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) and EduBase. ONS 
and HM Treasury for deflators. 
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Here, we repeat some of the analysis from our previous report, including the most recent 
financial year. Figure 2.8 shows that, in 2008–09, local authorities passed on about 63% 
of the funding they received on the basis of deprivation, on average. This amount was 
similar for both primary and secondary schools, having risen since 2005–06 in both 
cases. The reduction in ‘flattening’ was particularly significant for primary schools in 
2007–08, coinciding with the large growth in their overall implicit FSM premium that 
year.  
The issue of flattening of deprivation funding has been a major one for the Department 
for Children, Schools and Families. The department has encouraged local authorities to 
allocate greater levels of funding on the basis of social deprivation. It provided them with 
more information on how much of their funding is determined on the basis of deprivation 
and more advice on what mechanisms they can use to allocate funds to schools.9 Based on 
current evidence, it seems as if such pressure and information may well have induced 
local authorities to allocate a larger proportion of funds on the basis of deprivation.  
Stability and lack of responsiveness  
Whilst Chowdry, Muriel and Sibieta (2008) found that funding is, on average, strongly 
skewed towards schools with greater levels of social deprivation, they also found that 
changes in funding are much less sensitive to changes in social deprivation and 
educational need from year to year. Although schools with high levels of social 
deprivation do, on average, have higher levels of funding per pupil, schools that become 
more deprived in any given year are unlikely to see much change that year in their level 
of funding per pupil. This may exacerbate any incentive schools have to ‘cream-skim’ 
easy-to-teach pupils; harder-to-teach pupils may be more expensive to teach, but they do 
not seem to bring with them much immediate change in funding.  
More generally, historical levels of funding have always been used to determine current 
levels of funding. However, various mechanisms have been introduced to the school 
funding system in recent years that further favour stability. This possibly comes at the 
expense of tackling funding inequalities or responding to changes in need. Most of these 
stability mechanisms were introduced following on from the school funding ‘crisis’ of 
2003–04, in which a number schools complained that they were due to receive significant 
cuts in funding.  
One important mechanism increasing the inertia (and so reducing responsiveness) of 
schools’ per-pupil funding is the Minimum Funding Guarantee (MFG), which guarantees 
each school a minimum increase in funding per pupil each year. This guarantee limits the 
impact of local authorities’ fair-funding formulae, as these formula allocations are ignored 
if they provide schools with less than the level of the MFG.10 This almost certainly 
diminishes the responsiveness of school funding to changing needs from year to year. 
Indeed, the Audit Commission (2004) noted that ‘the minimum [funding] guarantee does 
not resolve issues of funding inequalities that might exist at school level. It has the 
potential to embed them and postpone them being tackled’ (page 11). 
                                                                  
9http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/management/schoolfunding/schoolfunding2008to11/deprivationfundingrevie
w200811/. 
10However, it should be noted that dispensation can be given to derogate from the Minimum Funding 
Guarantee with the permission of the Schools Forum and/or the Secretary of State.  
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The MFG was originally set at a relatively high level. In 2004–05, it was set at 4% per 
pupil in cash terms, two-thirds of the overall cash increase in the main grant provided to 
local authorities that year (6%). However, it is currently set at 2.1% per pupil for years 
2008–09 to 2010–11, around half of the average per-pupil increase in the Dedicated 
Schools Grant over these years (4.2% per year in cash terms). It has thus become a 
slightly less binding constraint recently.  
Another example of the way the school funding system currently favours stability is the 
so-called ‘spend-plus’ methodology currently used to determine most grants to local 
authorities and schools. Under this method, grants are determined as a flat-rate increase 
on what schools or local authorities received in the previous year, plus an extra increase 
determined on the basis of a formula. Like the Minimum Funding Guarantee, this limits 
the ability of the school funding system to redistribute money between schools or local 
authorities on the basis of changing need.  
Future changes 
The government is currently undertaking a review of the formula used for distributing 
the Dedicated Schools Grant (DSG), and school funding arrangements more generally. 
This review is intended to guide the development of the school funding settlement for 
2011 onwards. The main aim of this review is to: 
consider the development of a single transparent formula for the 
distribution of DSG, which distributes resources in line with relative 
need, recognising the different costs of educating particular groups of 
pupils and providing education in different areas.11 
The review aims to move beyond the spend-plus methodology used in recent years and 
develop a single needs-based formula to determine allocations to local authorities. The 
review is yet to report at the time of writing, but some of the relevant issues it is 
considering are: 
• whether the basic unit of funding should be determined on a top-down basis, as it is 
now, or through an activity- or needs-based analysis; 
• whether there is scope for further streamlining of direct grants and payments – for 
example, merging the School Standards Grant and School Development Grant into the 
Dedicated Schools Grant; 
• what indicators are best used when distributing money for pupils with additional 
educational needs; whether it is possible to attach money more directly to deprived 
pupils, for example, as they move round the system. 
To inform the review, the Department for Children, Schools and Families also 
commissioned a number of pieces of research relevant to school funding in England.12 
Some of the key findings of the review of additional educational needs are discussed in 
Sections 3.2 and 4.1. 
                                                                  
11Review of DSG Distribution Formula: Terms of Reference, 
http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/docbank/index.cfm?id=12419. 
12http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/management/schoolfunding/DSGformulareview/research/. 
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Summary of key characteristics and changes in school funding 
There is a great deal of variation in per-pupil funding between schools in England. Much 
of this variation is the result of funding weighted towards schools with more deprived 
intakes: primary schools receive an implicit FSM premium of about £2,460 on top of all 
other funding, and secondary schools receive about £3,370. A disproportionate share of 
these implicit FSM premiums results from specific grants made by central government, 
which make school funding more redistributive than it otherwise would be. However, the 
level of funding targeted at deprivation has increased rapidly in recent years, particularly 
in terms of the funding provided by local authorities. Local authorities still seem to 
‘flatten’ the funding they receive on the basis of deprivation, spreading it across all pupils 
instead, but the level of such flattening has reduced in recent years. This could well be the 
result of pressure and information from central government.  
The system is, however, still relatively unresponsive to changing needs from year to year. 
Several mechanisms, such as the Minimum Funding Guarantee, have been introduced that 
further favour stability in funding, possibly at the expense of tackling funding 
inequalities. The government is currently reviewing the system of school funding for 
2011 onwards, though no specific proposals have been announced at the time of writing.  
2.4 Proposals for a pupil premium 
Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have made proposals for the 
introduction of a pupil premium into the school funding system in England. Both sets of 
proposals would introduce a fixed amount provided to schools for pupils from a 
disadvantaged background, aimed at increasing the targeting of resources at schools with 
a high proportion of disadvantaged pupils, and reducing the disincentive to attract hard-
to-teach pupils. Such a reform could, in principle, also simplify the school funding system.  
The idea of a pupil premium 
The origins of the pupil premium can be traced back to proposals for a voucher system 
for schools in the 1960s – for example, Milton Friedman’s (1962) proposed system in 
which parents would be given a voucher equal to the average cost of a place in a state 
school. In his system, the parents could use this voucher to apply to any school, private or 
public, but the school had discretion over its admissions. If the cost of the school place 
exceeded the value of the voucher, parents could ‘top up’ the voucher from their own 
money in order to meet the total fee. Variants of this voucher system have been 
implemented across the US and other countries. In the UK, similar schemes have been 
proposed by various free-market think tanks and commentators – for example, Sexton 
(2002).  
However, concerns have been expressed about such a voucher system. Specifically, some 
have questioned whether it is fair or equitable to give an effective subsidy to those who 
would have chosen a fee-paying school in the absence of the voucher. Some have also 
expressed a concern that low-income families will be unable to afford the top-up fees 
charged in excess of the voucher value. Furthermore, if all pupils were to attract the same 
amount of voucher funding, then schools may still have an incentive to ‘cream-skim’ and 
not admit pupils deemed hard to teach.  
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In response to such concerns, Jencks (1970) proposed a different system of vouchers in 
which ‘topping up’ was not possible, but in which low-income parents received a larger 
voucher. This was designed to divert more resources to schools with larger numbers of 
disadvantaged pupils and reduce any disincentive on the part of schools to admit such 
pupils. The system was still a voucher policy: it maintained the notion of parental choice 
over which school to send their child to, and it aimed to increase competition between 
schools and drive up standards; it just placed more emphasis on redistribution.  
In 1989, Le Grand proposed a ‘positively discriminating voucher’, similar to Jencks’s 
scheme in that more money would be attached to pupils from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. This would provide more money to schools serving disadvantaged 
communities in the hope of raising attainment in these schools – an objective of all the 
main political parties in the UK. Under Le Grand’s proposal, schools serving more 
disadvantaged pupils ‘would have better premises and equipment and could attract 
higher quality staff’ (Le Grand, 2007). It was also designed to counteract the incentive for 
schools to ‘cream-skim’ easy-to-teach pupils in a competitive market for schools. The 
pupil premiums proposed by the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Party are 
largely inspired by Le Grand’s system and have similar aims.  
However, the parties have tended to place different emphases on the various mechanisms 
that could reduce the attainment gap between rich and poor. The Liberal Democrats have 
put the greatest emphasis on the direct effect of providing extra resources, with less 
emphasis on the indirect effects. Although the Conservatives also highlight the direct 
resource effect, they have put relatively more emphasis than the Liberal Democrats on 
the indirect or incentive effects, especially the effect of new schools. They have proposed 
reducing the barriers to creating new schools and the introduction of Swedish-style free 
schools, run by non-state providers. The pupil premium cannot be seen in isolation from 
this quite radical policy. 
Liberal Democrat proposals 
The Liberal Democrats (2009) have said that they are committed to: 
Introduc[ing] a Pupil Premium to close the performance gap between 
children from rich and poor families. £2.5bn extra would be used 
immediately to bring the funding of the poorest and most educationally 
disadvantaged 1 million children up to levels in private schools. 
They have also said that such a pupil premium would be attached to pupils eligible for 
free school meals, those with English as an additional language (but only for their first 
year), those with low- or medium-level special educational needs, and children in care. It 
would then be extended in future years to ‘include other children from low income 
households where one or more parent is in employment’. 
Under the Liberal Democrat proposals, the pupil premium would be in addition to all 
other sources of funding for schools (i.e. it would create an explicit FSM premium on top 
of the current implicit FSM premium). For example, a pupil premium could simply give 
schools an extra £2,500 for each of their pupils eligible for free school meals on top of all 
other funding.13 Such a premium would obviously increase the targeting of resources at 
                                                                  
13Recent proposals from the Liberal Democrats have stated that the pupil premium would be differentiated 
across local authorities. We have not attempted to model this, as to do so would require further details, which 
are not available.  
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pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds, and it would also increase the sensitivity of the 
system to changes in pupil needs from year to year.  
Funding for such a pupil premium would need to be found via increases in taxation, 
spending reductions elsewhere or new borrowing. The Liberal Democrats have proposed 
that a pupil premium of £2.5 billion could be funded via reductions in tax credits to 
families with above-average incomes and cuts to other areas of spending. 
Such a pupil premium would not change the role of local authorities in school funding 
decisions. It would simply represent another specific grant from central government, 
which local authorities must pass on to schools. However, when they observe the large 
increase in deprivation funding from a pupil premium, local authorities could respond by 
reducing the emphasis on deprivation in their own funding formulae. The fact that local 
authorities have tended to flatten deprivation funding in the past might suggest that they 
could well respond in this way. Preventing this unintended consequence of a pupil 
premium could require further constraints to be placed on the school funding decisions of 
local authorities.  
Lastly, how schools with large numbers of disadvantaged pupils would use the extra 
money from the pupil premium is an open question. The Liberal Democrats have chosen 
to put no constraints on how schools could use the extra resources. Schools could thus 
choose to target funds on individual pupils defined as being disadvantaged on the basis of 
the pupil premium, although they could also choose to spend them on other pupils they 
identify as needing extra resources for other reasons. However, the Liberal Democrats 
have also stated that ‘Schools would be held accountable by parents, the Local Authority 
and OFSTED for using their resources in sensible and innovative ways’. 
Conservative proposals 
In a draft chapter for their 2010 general election manifesto, the Conservatives state that 
‘We will introduce a pupil premium – weighting school funding towards children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds’.14 In an earlier paper outlining their plan for schools reform 
(Conservative Party, 2007), they state that: 
We have proposed an explicit Pupil Premium to increase per capita 
funding for pupils from deprived backgrounds ... We believe that the 
Pupil Premium should attach to pupils directly. ... [Schools within the 
maintained system] will thus be incentivised to seek out and accept 
pupils from more challenging backgrounds. (page 42) 
Therefore the Conservatives also seem committed to a pupil premium that would 
increase the targeting of resources towards pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds, and 
to making the system more responsive to changes in need from year to year.  
Furthermore, they have announced an ambition to move to a single national funding 
formula for all schools in England, with a pupil premium for disadvantaged pupils: 
In order to help schools plan and make them more accountable for what 
they spend we will ... shift towards a system in which there is a simplified 
                                                                  
14http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2010/01/~/media/Files/Draft%20Manifesto/DraftEduca
tionManifesto.ashx, page 7. 
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amount paid by the taxpayer per pupil (with the Pupil Premium on 
top).15 
This would represent a substantial reform to the school funding system in England. It 
would essentially abolish the role of local authorities in determining school funding. The 
system would instead be centralised, with power resting either with the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families or with an independent body appointed by the 
department. It could also lead to a substantial redistribution of resources across schools. 
However, it would greatly simplify the system of school funding.  
In principle, a single national funding formula could allow central government to allocate 
more resources to schools attended by disadvantaged pupils. It would also prevent any 
extra resources targeted at disadvantage from being flattened by local authorities. 
However, it remains an open question whether a single national formula with a pupil 
premium would increase or decrease the targeting of resources towards disadvantaged 
pupils. As we have already seen, the present system of school funding already produces 
reasonably high implicit FSM premiums. The pupil premium in a single national funding 
formula would replace implicit FSM premiums with an explicit version targeted at some 
measure of disadvantage – thereby simplifying the system of deprivation funding. 
However, if the pupil premium scheme is less redistributive than the present system, 
then it could in principle reduce the targeting of the school funding system at 
disadvantaged pupils. Indeed, in Department for Children, Schools and Families (2009c), 
the government stated that: 
Introducing a pupil premium ... could actually mean a smaller proportion 
of school funding allocated at national level for deprivation, and less 
money reaching schools with the most deprived pupils. [It] could replace 
more generous existing school funding streams that are allocated on the 
basis of deprivation. (page 72) 
Therefore whether it makes the system more or less redistributive is an empirical 
question and one that we will return to in Chapter 4, where we seek to model various 
options for a pupil premium.  
Unfortunately, the Conservatives have not said what would go into such a single national 
school funding formula. In particular, they have not said how they would measure 
‘disadvantage’, how much extra per-capita funding these pupils would receive or what 
the planned total cost of the scheme is. We can therefore only speculate as to what such a 
formula would include, and show the implications of various options for a single national 
funding formula. Finally, like the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives have not specified 
how money from the pupil premium would need to be spent by schools. 
Proposals from Policy Exchange 
In recent years, researchers at Policy Exchange have published a number of reports that 
have included proposals for a pupil premium, which seem likely to influence Conservative 
thinking in this area. O’Shaughnessy and Leslie (2005) proposed that pupils attending a 
failing school should receive a pupil premium in per-capita funding that could be taken to 
other schools – a proposal inspired by a similar scheme in Florida.  
                                                                  
15Speech by Michael Gove, 6 November 2009, 
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/11/Michael_Gove_A_comprehensive_programme_for_s
tate_education.aspx. 
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More recently, Freedman and Horner (2008) proposed a single national funding formula 
that would incorporate a pupil premium. Under this system, all school funding would be 
determined by a basic per-pupil amount (adjusted for area costs) plus a pupil premium 
system for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. They proposed using a geo-
demographic measure (MOSAIC), allocating greater levels of funding to pupils from 
MOSAIC types with lower average GCSE scores. Special educational needs funding would 
be determined by a separate independent agency.  
However, Freedman and Horner were not able to fully model their proposed scheme; 
instead, they modelled an approximate version. The total cost of this scheme was to be 
£4.6 billion, which would be met partly through the abolition of a number of direct 
government grants and payments (the School Development Grant, School Standards 
Grant, Personalised Learning Grant and other Standards Fund grants) and partly through 
other cuts to the education budget (abolition of the Education Maintenance Allowance, 
ContactPoint and the National Challenge programme). In Chapter 4, we will attempt to 
model the single funding formula originally proposed by Freedman and Horner (2008), 
along with their approximate version, comparing these with other potential models of a 
pupil premium. 
Summary of proposals for a pupil premium 
Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have made proposals for the 
introduction of a pupil premium into the school funding system in England. These 
proposals aim to increase the targeting of resources at schools with a high proportion of 
disadvantaged pupils, and to reduce the disincentive to attract hard-to-teach pupils. In 
the next chapter, we review the theory behind a pupil premium. We focus on whether or 
not extra resources could improve attainment amongst disadvantaged pupils and 
whether they might change schools’ incentives to admit such pupils. In Chapter 4, we will 
investigate the extent to which the options for a pupil premium make the system of 
school funding more or less redistributive, the numbers of schools that win or lose under 
these options and by how much they win or lose. This is particularly relevant for 
proposals – such as a single national funding formula – that would create a pupil 
premium through the abolition of some or all grants currently received by schools. Some 
schools would lose under such a scheme and it is important to know which schools these 
are, how significant the losses are and whether they can be mitigated.  
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3. Theory and empirical evidence 
Key findings 
• The pupil premium could narrow the achievement gap between advantaged and 
disadvantaged pupils through a number of mechanisms: the direct effect of extra 
resources; the indirect effect of changes to pupils’ peer group; or the indirect effect 
of the creation of new schools.  
• The conventional wisdom surrounding the impact of increasing school resources on 
pupil attainment is that ‘there is not a strong or consistent relationship between 
student performance and school resources’. Recent academic literature for the UK 
has provided some evidence of resource effects, however, though they are generally 
small in magnitude. There is some suggestion that extra resources for disadvantaged 
pupils would reduce the attainment gap, although this will depend on how those 
resources are used by schools.  
• Schools are unlikely to actively recruit more disadvantaged pupils as a result of the 
pupil premium: the premium would need to be very high to sufficiently reduce the 
disincentive for schools to attract such pupils, and schools’ ability to select pupils is 
also limited to some extent by the School Admissions Code. The pupil premium may 
lead to a small reduction in covert selection by schools but is unlikely to significantly 
reduce social segregation.  
• New schools may be established primarily in disadvantaged areas, although, without 
a ‘for-profit’ incentive, it is unlikely that the UK would see the same level of 
expansion that other countries have seen. We also find that an increase in the 
number of schools may lead to an increase in the level of segregation between 
schools, but this may not be detrimental to disadvantaged pupils. Several chains of 
schools in the US specialise in teaching pupils in disadvantaged areas and have 
reported significant gains in attainment.  
 
The main aim of the pupil premium proposed by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
parties is to narrow the attainment gap between rich and poor students. Proponents of 
the pupil premium claim that it will achieve this goal via a number of mechanisms, which 
are summarised in Figure 3.1.  
First, if extra resources improve attainment, then targeting extra funds at disadvantaged 
pupils will narrow the attainment gap between rich and poor students. We refer to this as 
the direct mechanism and discuss it in more depth in Section 3.1. The pupil premium 
could also indirectly narrow the attainment gap through changes to pupils’ peer group, 
the type of school they attend or the creation of new schools. We refer to these effects 
collectively as the indirect mechanisms.  
Some proponents of the pupil premium suggest that it will reduce schools’ incentives to 
‘cream-skim’ easy-to-teach or high-achieving pupils, and may even incentivise schools to 
attract disadvantaged pupils. In Section 3.2, we assess evidence to determine whether the 
pupil premium is likely to affect the distribution of pupils across schools. We also discuss 
the assumptions required for a change in the distribution of pupils across schools to 
reduce the attainment gap between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils.  
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Figure 3.1. Possible mechanisms through which the pupil premium may 
raise the attainment of disadvantaged pupils 
 
 
The Conservatives’ education policy would allow greater freedom for groups of 
individuals to create new schools. The pupil premium cannot be seen in isolation from 
this policy; a funding premium for disadvantaged pupils may increase the incentive for 
schools to be created, especially in more deprived areas. In Section 3.3, we therefore 
investigate the potential effects of the pupil premium via the creation of new schools.  
3.1 Direct impact of resources on pupil attainment 
In a review of the literature to date, Hanushek (1997) concludes that ‘there is not a strong 
or consistent relationship between student performance and school resources’ and that 
‘simple resource policies hold little hope for improving student outcomes’. Hanushek 
acknowledges that an increase in school resources could be effective in some situations, 
but believes extra resources will not consistently improve attainment unless 
accompanied by changes in schools’ incentives and organisation: 
The existing work does not suggest that resources never matter, nor does 
it suggest that resources could not matter. It only indicates that the 
current organization and incentives of schools do little to ensure that any 
added resources will be used effectively. (page 156)  
This view summarises the common academic perception of the effectiveness of increasing 
school resources, supported by cross-country evidence from the OECD (2008). Some 
recent evidence has found small but statistically significant resource effects, however. 
Dewey, Husted and Kenny (2000) claim to review a more recent and comprehensive body 
of literature than Hanushek, differentiating between studies they believe correctly 
Pupil premium 
Extra resources 
Increase in attainment for 
disadvantaged pupils 
New providers 
Increased competition Change in mix of 
pupils across schools 
Specialist schools 
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identify the effect of resources on attainment and those that do not.16 The authors 
conclude that the question of whether school inputs matter for the educational 
attainment of children is answered by ‘a resounding yes’, although they agree with 
Hanushek that not all schools will necessarily use extra resources effectively.  
We now present a brief summary of UK studies, which are likely to be more relevant for 
us in assessing any potential direct benefits of increasing school resources on pupil 
attainment. Would increasing resources necessarily reduce the attainment gap between 
advantaged and disadvantaged pupils? We note that once funds are allocated to schools, 
they are free to distribute resources between their pupils. If schools choose to allocate 
the extra funds disproportionately to advantaged pupils, then the attainment gap would 
not be reduced. This is an unlikely strategy for schools, however, and in any case most 
resources will affect whole classes rather than individual pupils. Even if resources are 
allocated as intended, it may also be the case that disadvantaged pupils do not gain for 
some reason. Although the evidence we review does not show conclusively whether 
advantaged or disadvantaged pupils gain more from extra resources, we conclude that 
disadvantaged pupils are likely to gain from extra resources just as much as advantaged 
pupils, and therefore any positive resource effect is likely to reduce the attainment gap.  
Evidence from the UK: NCDS 
A number of studies have used the National Child Development Study (NCDS) to estimate 
the relationship between school resources and attainment.17 The NCDS is a longitudinal 
survey of all the children born in the UK during the first week of March 1958; it contains a 
rich amount of data on these children throughout their childhood and on later life 
outcomes. We review three studies that use the richness of this data set to attempt to 
isolate the effect of school quality.18 These papers acknowledge that schools can choose to 
spend resources in a number of different ways. There could be a general increase in 
spending in all areas, or resources could be targeted at reducing the number of pupils per 
class (known as the pupil–teacher ratio). We summarise the findings of these papers 
below, and again in Table 3.1. 
Feinstein and Symons (1999) find no significant effect of the pupil–teacher ratio (PTR) on 
academic attainment. However, Dustmann, Rajah and van Soest (2003) find that an 
increase in the school PTR by one standard deviation (i.e. an increase in average class 
sizes) decreases the probability that pupils stay in education beyond the compulsory 
school-leaving age by about 4 percentage points. Dearden, Ferri and Meghir (2002) find 
that the school PTR has no impact on educational qualifications, although there are some 
positive resource effects on future wages for women.  
These studies using the rich NCDS data find some evidence of benefits to pupils in schools 
with a lower average PTR, although this is by no means universal. The results may not be 
the most relevant when thinking about the current school funding system, however, as 
the NCDS cohort went through the British education system in the 1970s.  
                                                                  
16They believe that income should not be used as a proxy for the time the parent spends teaching the child, as 
there are conflicting income/substitution effects of time as income increases. In the US school funding system 
from which most data are derived, there is also multicollinearity between income and school quality, as nearly 
half of all public school funding resources are generated from local taxation. The US system generates large 
funding differences between wealthy and impoverished communities (Biddle and Berliner, 2003). 
17The NCDS is an individual-level data set with comprehensive information on educational outcomes, prior 
attainment, family background and school quality. 
18Through the addition of explanatory variables to control for the effect of prior attainment, family 
background and local environment on educational attainment. 
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Recent evidence from the UK 
In the current school funding system, resources are not allocated randomly; they are 
determined by pupil characteristics (including attainment levels). This causes a problem 
in using actual differences in funding across schools to isolate the impact of resources. 
For instance, since deprived and low-achieving schools tend to receive higher levels of 
funding, a simple correlation of funding and average attainment would probably lead one 
to (falsely) conclude that higher funding reduces attainment. The correlation is simply the 
result of the school funding system targeting resources at measures of educational 
disadvantage. To get around this reverse causality problem (sometimes referred to as the 
‘endogeneity’ of school resources), a more recent group of academic papers in the UK 
have attempted to isolate the impact of school resources on pupil attainment by using an 
‘instrument’ – an exogenous or random change in the level of school resources. These 
studies use administrative data on pupils’ attainment from the National Pupil Database 
(NPD), as well as school finance data. Each study is summarised in Table 3.1. 
Holmlund, McNally and Viarengo (2008) investigate the impact of extra resources for 
schools on pupils’ attainment in their Key Stage 2 (KS2) exams, taken at the end of 
primary school in England when pupils are aged 10–11. They present results from a 
multivariate regression (a statistical model that controls for multiple explanatory factors) 
that they believe accounts for most of the endogeneity problem. As an alternative 
strategy, they also use data on a subsample of local authorities, which contain 
information about how they distribute funding to schools and how their funding formulae 
change over time. This strategy essentially measures the effect of an increase in school 
resources by comparing schools in one local authority (LA) with equally-deprived schools 
in another LA that allocates more or less resources on the basis of deprivation in its local 
formulae. The main results of the paper suggest that an increase of £1,000 in average 
expenditure per pupil would increase the number of pupils achieving the expected level 
of attainment at KS2 by 2.2, 2.0 and 0.7 percentage points in English, Maths and Science 
respectively. These figures are roughly equal to 3, 2.5 and 1.5 weeks’ worth of progress in 
the three subjects, which may be considered a small impact given the associated costs.  
The authors find positive and statistically significant effects for most subgroups, but there 
is some variation in the estimated impacts of expenditure: disadvantaged schools19 gain 
more from extra resources in English, but less in Science and Maths; pupils eligible for 
free schools meals (FSM) gain more in English and Maths, but less in Science; there is a 
stronger effect of expenditure on high-ability students in all subjects. 
Levačić et al. (2005) ask whether attainment in Key Stage 3 (KS3) exams, taken in state 
schools in England when pupils are aged 13–14, is affected by the level of school 
resources. They attempt to overcome the problem of endogeneity of school resources by 
looking at the political affiliation of the local authority. They argue that political affiliation 
affects the financing of schools but is not related to the characteristics of pupils and 
parents. Under these assumptions, political affiliation can therefore be used to isolate the 
effect of resources on attainment. Using this strategy, the authors find that spending £100 
more per pupil raises pupil attainment at KS3 by 0.04 of a Key Stage level, while reducing 
the school PTR by one pupil raises pupil attainment by 0.1 of a level in Maths and 0.12 of 
a level in Science, but there are no significant effects for English. They conclude that 
                                                                  
19Defined by the proportion of students in the school eligible for free school meals, and included in the 
regression. 
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additional spending to reduce the student–teacher ratio is more effective than an 
increase in general expenditure. Focusing on subgroups of the student population, they 
find that those in the middle of the ability distribution, and those in the highest ability 
quintile who are eligible for FSM, gain more from an increase in school resources. 
Jenkins, Levačić and Vignoles (2006) ask whether attainment at GCSE is affected by the 
level of school resources. They use the same strategy as Levačić et al. described above 
(using the political affiliation of the LA to isolate the effect of school resources). They also 
find that reducing the school PTR is more effective than increasing the general spending 
on the school, although the effect of reducing the PTR from current levels by one pupil 
over the five-year duration of secondary school is very small (at most 1.2 GCSE grades) 
and would require spending around £127 extra per annum per pupil. They find that 
students from the bottom 60% of the prior achievement distribution gain more from an 
increase in the school’s resources, but that there was no significant difference in the 
impact between those who were eligible for FSM and those who were not.  
The Excellence in Cities (EiC) programme was an initiative launched under the Labour 
government in 1999 that aimed to alleviate poor student attainment in disadvantaged 
urban areas. It is therefore highly relevant to a discussion of the pupil premium. EiC gives 
extra funding to schools in the programme, but also has additional aims such as 
encouraging cooperation between schools in the dissemination of knowledge. Machin, 
McNally and Meghir (2004) evaluate whether student attainment in Maths and English at 
KS3 improved as a result of EiC, and also look at the impact of EiC on unauthorised 
absences from school. Their method matches schools that received the extra funding with 
similar schools that did not. Comparing the attainment in the ‘treatment’ and 
‘comparison’ groups gives a reliable estimate for the impact of EiC. The authors find that 
attainment in Maths increased in schools in the EiC programme, but their results were 
less statistically significant for English. The average effect of EiC was an increase in Maths 
attainment of about 0.5 to 0.8 of a percentile. There was also a significant reduction in 
unauthorised absences: the number of half-days missed decreased by 30%.  
This evidence gives encouraging signs for the benefits of increasing school resources. The 
impacts following the EiC programme cannot be interpreted as the direct result of an 
increase in funds, however. This is because the additional expenditure was tied to many 
strands of the project, such as investment in Learning Mentors, Learning Support Units 
and a Gifted and Talented Programme within the schools, as well as capital investment in 
‘City Learning Centres’ to promote school and community learning. A pupil premium, by 
contrast, would be applicable to all schools (not just urban ones) and funding is unlikely 
to be tied to any particular interventions. 
Factors influencing the effectiveness of extra school resources 
The recent evidence we reviewed above finds a positive effect of increasing resources at 
the school level, although the effects are small in magnitude. This contrasts with many 
people’s belief that extra resources have a large impact on pupil attainment. Could there 
be any factors that influence or constrain the effectiveness of extra resources, and 
therefore explain why larger gains are not observed?  
First, we note that schools currently have a limited empirical research base on which to 
make resource allocation decisions; Levačić and Vignoles (2002) argue that until better 
empirical evidence on the impact of using resources in different ways becomes available, 
Theory and empirical evidence 
27 
little guidance can be given to head teachers and teachers as to the ‘best’ way to allocate a 
marginal increase in resources. 
Some recent studies suggest that high-quality teachers make a big difference to a child’s 
academic attainment. In the UK, Burgess, Davies and Slater (2009) find that being taught 
by a high-quality teacher as opposed to a low-quality teacher increases attainment at 
GCSE by one-quarter of a standard deviation.20 In the US, Aaronson, Barrow and Sander 
(2007) find that teacher quality has an impact on pupil attainment of a similar magnitude. 
They also find that African American students and students of low to middle prior ability 
gain the most from being taught by a good teacher. Therefore, recruiting high-quality 
teachers to schools with disadvantaged pupils could well reduce the attainment gap 
between rich and poor pupils. 
In theory, high-quality teachers could be attracted to and retained in schools in 
disadvantaged areas through better working conditions or higher pay. In practice, this is 
not possible in the current UK system due to central pay bargaining; head teachers have 
little flexibility in setting pay and conditions when recruiting new teachers (Chowdry, 
Muriel and Sibieta, 2008). A recent report argues that unless there is reform to the way 
teachers are paid, the pupil premium will have little impact on pupils’ achievement as 
resources cannot be directed to where they are most needed (Wolf, 2010). More evidence 
is needed to assess the impact of such a radical shift in policy, however.  
Recently-established academy schools in England have slightly more autonomy than 
other types of school – for example, flexibility in setting teachers’ pay and the length of 
the school day. There has been some anecdotal evidence of the changes occurring in 
academies – for example, giving better incentive structures to staff (and in some cases 
students21), providing more staff development or making changes to the organisation of 
the school day. A report by PwC, commissioned by the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families (DCSF) in 2008, also details some examples of these innovative changes. In 
some schools, teachers receive a personal fund for professional development (up to 
£1,500 per staff member per year), a broader range of staff have been recruited into 
many academy schools, and in some cases the school day has been extended. These 
findings may not be representative of general practice in academy schools, however, as 
the report does not give details of the frequency of these practices. 
An evaluation of the performance of pupils in academy schools may therefore give some 
indication of the likely effects of greater autonomy. Machin and Wilson (2008) compare 
similar schools that differ only in their academy status and conclude that there are no 
statistically significant differences in pupil performance. This suggests that school 
autonomy has so far had little impact on pupil attainment, although the authors suggest 
that further evidence to evaluate the academy programme is needed.  
There are clearly many factors that influence the effectiveness of extra school resources. 
More research is needed on the effectiveness of spending resources in different ways to 
enable head teachers to allocate resources efficiently. A firmer evidence base is also 
                                                                  
20Burgess et al. define a high-quality teacher as a teacher above the 75th percentile (i.e. among the top 25 out 
of 100 teachers) and a low-quality teacher as a teacher below the 25th percentile (i.e. among the bottom 25 
out of 100 teachers). They calculate the measure of teacher quality based on multiple regression analysis of the 
average class attainment, controlling for all pupil characteristics possible.  
21Academy schools in England have greater freedom than other types of school. They can, for example, decide 
to pay students for achieving ‘good’ GCSE results, as experimented with in Bristol 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bristol/6960673.stm). 
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needed to assess the implications of increasing school autonomy (particularly in regard 
to recruiting higher-quality teachers). 
Summary of the effect of increases in school resources 
The conventional wisdom about the impact of increasing school resources on pupil 
attainment is that ‘there is not a strong or consistent relationship between student 
performance and school resources’ (Hanushek, 1997). Hanushek and others have 
suggested that this may be because schools are constrained in the way they can spend 
additional resources. For example, in the UK, teachers’ pay and working conditions are 
set by the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document, so schools in disadvantaged 
areas may be unable to recruit high-quality teachers. Wolf (2010) argues that unless 
there is reform to the way teachers are paid, the pupil premium will have little impact on 
pupils’ achievement. There is currently no evidence to give an indication of the impact of 
increasing schools’ autonomy, although more detailed evidence from the academy 
programme in the UK may be useful in the future.  
In spite of these constraints, recent academic literature for the UK has provided some 
evidence of positive resource effects, though they are generally small in magnitude. 
Results suggest that focusing resources on reductions in the pupil–teacher ratio of a 
school is more cost-effective than increasing the general level of spending at a school, but 
there are likely to be variations in effectiveness between schools. The literature does not 
provide us with any conclusive idea about the type of students who are most likely to 
gain from an increase in school resources: one study suggests that high-ability students 
gain more from an increase in resources, while another finds it is those from the lower 
end of the ability distribution that gain most.  
We conclude that increasing resources is likely to have a direct impact on pupils’ 
attainment. As the extra resources will be targeted at schools with disadvantaged pupils, 
they seem likely to decrease the attainment gap between rich and poor pupils. 
3.2 Indirect impact of peer groups  
If a child’s peer group in their class has an impact on their attainment, then schools that 
are segregated by ability will have a negative effect on the attainment of disadvantaged 
pupils, increasing the attainment gap. If the pupil premium somehow changes the 
distribution of pupils across schools, then this may indirectly reduce the attainment gap 
between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils.  
Gibbons and Telhaj (2007) conclude that English schools are highly segregated by ability, 
as there is a large difference in the average ability of pupils going to the ‘best’ 
comprehensive schools and those going to the ‘worst’.22 In terms of social segregation, 
England is a middle-ranking country out of rich industrialised nations (Jenkins, 
Micklewright and Schneff, 2006), though countries that are more segregated than 
England generally still use academic selection in state secondary schools. Social or ability 
segregation in England’s schools may come primarily from residential segregation, but 
that is unlikely to be the sole determinant. Whatever its causes, Gibbons and Telhaj 
                                                                  
22The average ability of pupils going into the ‘best’ comprehensive secondary schools is around 30 percentiles 
of the pupil ability distribution above the average ability in the ‘worst’. ‘Ability’ is measured by the pupil’s 
level of attainment in KS2 exams at the end of primary school. 
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(2007) note that segregation of pupils along ability lines may increase the attainment gap 
between disadvantaged and advantaged pupils. This is because segregation may ‘work to 
exacerbate inequalities in educational outcomes – either through peer-group effects or 
because disadvantaged pupils place greater pressure on teaching resources’. The ‘pure’ 
peer-group effect means that the behaviour, participation in class and social norms of a 
pupil’s classroom peers have an effect on that pupil’s academic attainment. A pupil’s peer 
group also affects the resources they receive, as disadvantaged pupils put more pressure 
on resources in the classroom. If resources matter, as discussed in Section 3.1, then a 
more disadvantaged peer group will have a negative impact on a pupil’s attainment.  
We now evaluate the evidence that peer groups matter for educational attainment, 
followed by a summary of how the pupil premium could work to change the existing 
distribution of disadvantaged pupils across schools.  
Do peer effects matter? 
Gibbons and Telhaj (2006) conclude that a child’s peer group has an impact on their 
attainment, although it is small in magnitude. Their paper compares outcomes of children 
who attended the same primary school up to age 11, but then moved on to different 
secondary schools alongside new schoolmates of various abilities. The authors assume 
that the ability level of the new peer group is random,23 although this may only be true in 
circumstances where the allocation of pupils to secondary schools is random by design 
(for example, in a lottery admissions system).  
Standardised attainment tests in secondary schools in England have a number of tiered 
papers, tailored to different levels of ability. Students are assigned to a tiered paper and 
will generally be grouped according to this tier. Within each tier group, however, 
assignment into classrooms can be based on ability or be essentially random. Atkinson et 
al. (2008) use this variation across schools to measure peer effects. They find significant 
evidence that pupils who are randomly grouped with higher-ability peers have higher 
attainment than those who are randomly grouped with lower-ability peers. The authors 
point out, however, that their results may partly be due to the structure of the tiered 
examination that pupils sit.  
The papers discussed above suggest that it is the ability of the peer group and not the 
social composition that matters (although in practice the two are highly correlated). If it 
is the ability of a pupil’s peer group that matters, the evidence suggests that the pupil 
premium could reduce the attainment gap between rich and poor students in two ways. 
First, if the distribution of pupils across schools remained the same but the academic 
attainment of disadvantaged pupils rose, then this would have a positive impact on their 
peers and multiply the effect of the pupil premium. Second, if the distribution of pupils 
across schools became more even, disadvantaged pupils would have higher-ability peers, 
which may increase their attainment. This second mechanism does not require a direct 
impact of extra resources on attainment. We now discuss this second mechanism in more 
detail.  
                                                                  
23For the strategy to work, the ability of the new school peers must be uncorrelated with unobserved 
characteristics of the pupil. This assumption is unlikely to hold in some cases, however – for example, if ‘pushy’ 
parents get their children into the school with the ‘best’ peers and also push their child to work harder in 
school. 
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Could the pupil premium reduce segregation in schools? 
A recent DCSF report states that ‘a powerful driver of the social segregation of schools is 
residential segregation in combination with admission arrangements prioritising 
proximity’ (Coldron et al., 2008). Although much of the segregation in England’s schools 
comes from residential segregation, it has been hypothesised that covert selection from 
schools also plays a role (West, Ingram and Hind, 2006). Parental preferences (in addition 
to their choice of residence) may also contribute to segregation in schools, since 
segregation is greater in locations where there are many alternative schools (Burgess et 
al., 2004). The introduction of a pupil premium could change the distribution of pupils 
across schools through either a change in schools’ behaviour (the supply side) or a 
change in parents’ behaviour (the demand side). We now discuss these two options. 
The supply side: will there be a reduction in ‘cream-skimming’ by schools? 
Schools in England may currently have an incentive to ‘cream-skim’ prospective pupils 
who seem easiest to teach, or high-ability pupils who will improve the school’s position in 
exam league tables.24 Le Grand (1989) proposed the idea of a ‘positively discriminating 
voucher’ in response to this adverse side-effect of school choice in a market system. He 
noted that the premium paid for every child from a disadvantaged background would 
provide schools with a ‘positive incentive’ to take them in, and this feature of the pupil 
premium has been recognised and championed by the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties.25  
While schools’ main objectives are not simply to maximise their income, they are not 
purely altruistic either. In particular, schools will want to be compensated for the 
expected higher cost of teaching pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. If the money 
attached to such pupils is less than this perceived cost, then schools have a disincentive to 
attract such pupils. If the pupil premium were to increase the money attached to 
disadvantaged pupils, then this disincentive could be reduced.  
Perceptions of the cost of teaching pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds are likely to 
vary across schools. A survey of schools undertaken for DCSF by PwC (2009) suggests 
that schools currently spend about £1,750 for each pupil with additional educational 
needs (excluding those with high-cost SEN), but that they perceive there to be an ‘unmet 
need’ averaging about £1,800 for each such pupil that cannot be met through existing 
funding. The fact that schools perceive there to be an unmet need suggests there is 
currently a disincentive to attract pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds.  
Further evidence also suggests that the pupil premium would need to be large to reduce 
this disincentive. Under the current school funding system, pupils with special 
educational needs (SEN) have a large funding premium,26 but they are still under-
represented in more autonomous schools (West, Ingram and Hind, 2006). This suggests 
that the (already large) premium for taking them is not large enough, although the under-
                                                                  
24Since 2006, published league tables have also provided a measure of how much progress pupils make in the 
school – the contextual value added. It is likely that most parents are more aware of the absolute attainment 
of the school, however – for example, the percentage of students reaching the expected level of attainment. 
25The Conservative Party (2007) has stated that the current system of school funding ‘fails to encourage good 
schools to admit the hardest to help children’ and that, under the pupil premium reform, schools would be 
‘incentivised to seek out and accept pupils from more challenging backgrounds’. The Liberal Democrats note 
the ‘greater incentives for schools to take “hard to help” pupils’ as they can be certain that they will receive 
the extra cash they need’ (http://www.neec2009.co.uk/LibDem.asp). 
26The level of additional funds allocated for pupils with SEN depends on the level of their need, and is assessed 
and allocated by the local authority in the most severe cases. 
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representation could be driven by parents’ preferences and not covert selection by 
autonomous schools.  
We have noted above that the premium attached to disadvantaged pupils may not be 
large enough for schools to actively recruit them. Even if schools did wish to actively 
recruit certain types of students, however, they may be constrained, as the School 
Admissions Code (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2010) states that 
schools should not select pupils on the basis of their characteristics. In practice, however, 
schools may find ways to circumvent the restrictions. West, Ingram and Hind (2006) find 
that autonomous schools in England reported using potentially selective admissions 
criteria, while Allen and West (2009) investigate the selective practices of ‘elite’ faith 
schools in England. They find that:  
within the religious sector there are both Catholic and Anglican socially 
selective ‘elite’ secondary schools that appear to ‘select out’ low-income 
religious families, thereby displacing them to religious schools with a less 
affluent composition. (page 489) 
The School Admissions Code was designed (and strengthened) to limit schools’ ability to 
‘cream-skim’ desirable pupils, but it may also work to restrain schools’ ability to attract 
disadvantaged pupils with a desirable enough ‘premium’. However, schools that wanted a 
representative student intake (that is, with an increased share of disadvantaged pupils) 
could choose to implement a ‘fair-banding’ admissions policy or a lottery system.27 
Selective advertising of the school could also influence the type of pupils who choose to 
apply (although, again, this may be against the spirit of the current School Admissions 
Code).  
Lastly, there may be a further potential benefit from the pupil premium policy, in 
reducing the complexity and increasing the transparency of the current system. At 
present, schools might not be responding to financial incentives to attract disadvantaged 
pupils because of the complexity of the current funding streams for deprivation. A pupil 
premium could, in principle, reduce such complexity, and increase the likelihood that 
schools perceive and respond to financial incentives to attract disadvantaged pupils.  
The demand side: will there be a change in the type of school that parents 
choose? 
Since the 1988 Education Reform Act, parents in England have had the right to express a 
preference for the school their child attends, although in practice the allocation of places 
at a popular school is often determined by proximity. Evidence shows that parents value 
schools that perform well academically: some parents are prepared to pay large house-
price premiums to live in the catchment area of a ‘good’ school (Gibbons and Machin, 
2003 and 2006; Black, 1999). If parents only care about academic standards, and the 
pupil premium succeeds in reducing the attainment gap between advantaged and 
disadvantaged pupils, then the pupil premium could create a more balanced distribution 
of advantaged and disadvantaged pupils across schools.  
Academic standards are not likely to be the only important consideration for parents, 
however; Coldron, Cripps and Shipton (2010) argue that a school’s social composition has 
                                                                  
27Academies can choose whether to operate fair banding in their admissions. As academies are usually located 
in deprived areas, however, the ‘fair’ banding based on the normal distribution will not reflect the 
representative population of the local area. See http://www.furnessacademy.com/2009/09/fair-banding.html. 
A lottery system for oversubscribed schools has been introduced in Brighton and Hove 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/6403017.stm). 
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a large impact on the ‘choice’ of more educated parents. Burgess, Greaves et al. (2009) 
show that proximity and the composition of the school (in terms of the percentage of 
students with FSM) are also factors that are important when parents choose which school 
they want their child to attend. By comparing the school chosen by parents with all other 
feasible schools in the local area, Burgess et al. find that parents require an increase in 
academic standards of 1.77 percentage points to compensate them for a 1 percentage 
point increase in the proportion of pupils with FSM. The importance of peer groups is 
also corroborated by Rothstein (2006), with US data, and Schneider and Buckley (2002), 
who use evidence from parents’ internet search patterns on a US schools database to 
infer the characteristics that are important in their school choice.  
On the demand side, therefore, parental preferences for a ‘good’ peer group may make 
their school choice insensitive to changes in funding for disadvantaged pupils. In some 
cases, however, the pupil premium may indeed change the demand for certain schools, 
and thereby reduce social segregation in England’s schools. So it is important to think 
about why parents care about the peer group in the school: 
• Parents may only care about the academic ability of a child’s peer group. In this case, 
segregation in England’s schools will decrease if the pupil premium sufficiently 
reduces the attainment gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students. A large 
response to a possibly small change in the attainment gap would be necessary, 
however.  
• Parents may care about their child’s peer group because of the implied allocation of 
resources per pupil. In the current system, parents may worry that each additional 
disadvantaged pupil reduces the resources available for their child. The pupil 
premium should partially redress this, as schools should receive some of the 
additional resources they require. Parents will not have perfect information on the 
allocation of funds within the school, however, and so a large change through this 
mechanism may be unlikely. 
In contrast to the two scenarios above, advantaged parents may only care about the ‘type’ 
of child their child is educated with. Parents may want their child to be educated with 
‘people like them’, regardless of the peer group’s ability (Ball, 2003). If advantaged 
parents’ decisions are unaffected by an increase in resources and/or attainment of 
disadvantaged pupils, this will reduce the impact of the pupil premium through peer 
effects; the distribution of pupils across schools will be unchanged. Even in this case, 
however, if it is the ability of a peer group that matters and the extra resources succeed in 
raising the attainment of disadvantaged pupils, then the positive effects of the pupil 
premium could be multiplied. 
Summary of the indirect impact of peer groups  
Some evidence shows that the academic ability of a pupil’s peer group matters for their 
own attainment. If the pupil premium increases attainment through the direct 
mechanism discussed in Section 3.1, then the positive resource effect would be amplified: 
poorer students would now have higher-attaining peers, which would help increase their 
attainment. In the research reviewed, however, academic attainment and social 
composition are likely to be correlated. It could be that the current level of social 
segregation between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils (and not segregation by 
ability) is contributing to educational inequalities. If the pupil premium reduces such 
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social segregation, then it could have an indirect impact on attainment and help to 
alleviate the ‘attainment gap’ between advantaged and disadvantaged students.  
The change in the distribution of pupils across schools in response to a pupil premium 
could arise from the supply side (if schools want to change their intake) or the demand 
side (if parents want to change the type of school they apply to). Evidence we review 
shows that schools are unlikely to actively recruit more disadvantaged pupils: the 
premium would need to be very high to sufficiently reduce the disincentive for schools to 
attract such pupils, and schools are limited to some extent by the School Admissions 
Code. However, the pupil premium would at least make the funding system more 
transparent and make any financial incentives easier to observe. Although there are some 
possible scenarios in which parents might change the type of school they apply to, it is 
likely that the introduction of the pupil premium will have little effect on the demand 
side. Therefore, the pupil premium may lead to a small reduction in covert selection by 
schools but is unlikely to significantly reduce social segregation in schools.  
In the next section, we detail how opposition policy proposals for new schools could 
interact with the pupil premium to increase the supply of schools, and especially schools 
in disadvantaged areas. If these schools were more effective in teaching disadvantaged 
pupils, then having disadvantaged peers would not necessarily have a negative effect on a 
pupil’s attainment.  
3.3 Indirect impact of new schools 
The Conservatives’ education policy would allow greater freedom for groups of 
individuals to create new schools (Conservative Party, 2007). The pupil premium would 
be bound to interact with this policy: a funding premium for disadvantaged pupils may 
increase the incentive for new schools to be created, especially in more deprived areas. 
As resources would necessarily follow pupils, groups working to set up a school would 
have a clear idea of the level of funding they could expect, based on the number of pupils 
they successfully attracted.  
Increasing the supply of new schools may have a beneficial impact on the attainment of 
disadvantaged pupils if new schools are created that specialise in teaching such pupils. 
These schools may have innovative teaching techniques, for example, or specialise in 
raising aspiration. Aside from the impact on its own pupils, a new school may raise 
attainment in all schools nearby by increasing competition, leading to an increase in 
productivity.  
This section will assess whether a pupil premium, coupled with changes to allow new 
schools to be created, would have an indirect effect on the attainment of disadvantaged 
pupils. We first examine whether or not many new schools are likely to be established, 
drawing on evidence from Chile, Sweden and the US. We also discuss the types of schools 
that are likely to be set up and the likely impact they will have on pupils’ attainment. 
Finally, we examine whether the presence of new schools may induce improvements in 
productivity in all schools, and how these mechanisms will affect the attainment gap 
between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils. 
Would new schools be created? 
The Conservatives’ education policies combine the introduction of the pupil premium 
policy with more freedom for groups to set up new schools. We therefore cannot discuss 
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the pupil premium policy independently; we must assess how the interaction between 
the two policies could reduce the attainment gap between rich and poor pupils.  
‘School choice’ has a different interpretation in different countries, but a common theme 
is that parents are able to make some kind of choice about the school they want their 
child to attend. This may be through expressing a preference for a school (as in the UK) or 
by using a voucher to pay for a place at a school (as in Chile, Sweden and some parts of 
the US28). In most cases, a school’s budget is tied to the number of pupils it enrols, so 
schools have an incentive to compete for pupils (and funds) by raising standards. In 
theory, the introduction of new schools should create more pressure for a school to raise 
standards, improving the attainment of its pupils. This has the potential to reduce the 
attainment gap between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils if there are more 
productivity gains for disadvantaged pupils. We now look at evidence from other 
countries to assess whether new schools are likely to be created in the UK. 
Hsieh and Urquiola (2002) document changes in school provision in Chile following the 
introduction of a nationwide voucher system in 1981:  
More than a thousand (often for-profit) private schools entered the 
market, and the private enrollment rate increased from 20 to 40 percent 
by 1988, surpassing the 50 percent mark in many urban areas. (page 1) 
In the US, autonomous charter schools are allowed in states that have passed charter 
legislation. Each piece of state legislation passed may be unique to that state, and creates 
differences in the types and number of charter schools opened in each state, the level of 
freedom afforded charter schools and the amount of accountability required of the 
schools.29 Since the 1990s when state legislators began passing charter legislation, the 
number of charter schools in the US has increased steadily; there were over 5,000 new 
charter schools across all states in 2009.30  
In the early 1990s, Sweden began to operate a universal voucher scheme and also made it 
possible for groups other than municipalities to run schools. This change in policy has 
increased the number of independent school providers, from 42 in 1993 to 246 in 2003 
(Böhlmark and Lindahl, 2008). There were 565 independent or ‘free’ schools in Sweden 
in 2005, accounting for 11% of the country’s 4,963 schools.31 The Conservative Party 
(2007) believes that the Swedish system provides the ‘closest model’ for its plans for 
education reform; in particular, the Conservatives would allow the creation of ‘free 
schools’ that also receive funding through the pupil premium.  
The system proposed for the UK has an important difference, however: tentative 
Conservative proposals suggest that none of the new schools would be ‘for profit’. Would 
this difference affect the number of new schools likely to be set up in the UK? Lacireno-
Paquet et al. (2002) document the type of charter schools that have entered the market in 
                                                                  
28Vouchers are universal only in Chile and Sweden. In these countries, all pupils are eligible for the voucher, 
which can be used for any type of school. In the US, there are various schemes of specifically-targeted 
vouchers, most famously those in Milwaukee and Cleveland. Milwaukee’s publicly-funded voucher scheme was 
introduced in 1990, specifically targeting low-income families to allow them to attend registered private 
schools (Tooley, Dixon and Stanfield, 2003). In some US states, school competition refers to the impact of 
charter schools, which are non-fee-paying autonomous schools set up independently from the public sector. 
29US Department of Education, 2000, http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/charter4thyear/a1.html. 
30Centre for Education Reform, 2009, http://www.edreform.com/_upload/CER_charter_numbers.pdf. 
31Swedish National Agency for Education; see Department for Education and Skills / Prime Minister’s Strategy 
Unit (2006). 
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the US, distinguishing between market-oriented and non-market-oriented charter 
schools. They define market-oriented charter schools as those ‘with links to for-profit 
corporations, with a strong business presence on their founding boards, and those with 
entrepreneurial plans for expansion’ and non-market-oriented charter schools as 
‘spawned by existing non profit organizations with long traditions in the local 
community’. They find that 17 of the 30 charter schools in Washington DC were non-
market-oriented, suggesting that a significant number of new schools could have been 
motivated by altruistic factors.  
In the UK, over 300 parents, teachers and community groups have expressed an interest 
in opening new community-run primary and secondary schools in response to tentative 
Conservative proposals.32 A new supply of schools looks likely, therefore, but what sort of 
providers would there be? Would large chains of schools emerge, as in Sweden and the 
US? In what areas would they establish themselves? Would there be specialist chains of 
schools serving disadvantaged areas?  
Sweden’s largest chain of schools, called Kunskapsskolan, now has 32 schools, with an 
annual profit of 2% of its turnover. When asked whether the for-profit motive was 
important for their schools, Kunskapsskolan replied that it was imperative: 
The company would not have existed were it not for its investors. It can 
only provide the high quality inputs that it does – such as employing the 
school managers many months before the school starts, and supplying 
additional equipment – with that investment. The profit motive allows it 
to bring additional investment into schools, something that parents 
welcome. (Tooley, Dixon and Stanfield, 2003, p. 15) 
The profit motive has the potential to create important incentives for new school 
providers; the premium paid for disadvantaged pupils could encourage schools to 
establish in deprived areas. Chains of specialist schools for teaching these pupils may 
emerge, similar to the chains found in Sweden. However, there are examples of non-profit 
chains of schools: Green Dot schools in the US have now set up 18 charter high schools in 
the highest-need areas of Los Angeles, while 82 Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) 
schools educate children mainly from low-income families in the District of Columbia.  
Although the evidence is not clear, even without the for-profit motive it is likely that new 
schools will be created in the UK under the opposition proposals. It is likely that allowing 
for-profit schools would increase the number of new schools created. We conclude that 
schools in disadvantaged areas are more likely to be established with the pupil premium 
policy, as the extra resources should reduce the disincentive to specialise in teaching this 
population. Again, a for-profit motive could increase the number of schools further. If 
new schools are established in disadvantaged areas, this has the potential to increase 
attainment for disadvantaged students and therefore reduce the attainment gap. More 
research into the motivation of potential providers and the market demand for such 
schools is almost certainly needed, however. The evidence on the impact of new schools 
is discussed in the next subsection. 
                                                                  
32See ‘Parents enticed by Tory plan for “free schools”’, The Guardian at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/dec/13/parents-tory-plan-free-schools. 
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Potential effects of increased school choice 
The economist Caroline Hoxby (2003) asserts that school choice is a ‘tide that lifts all 
boats’: pupils in all types of school gain when a new school enters the market, as all 
schools have an incentive to improve their productivity to attract pupils. Hoxby writes 
that the ‘gains and losses from reallocation might be nothing more than crests and valleys 
on the surface of the much higher water level’ (page 288).  
Hoxby presents an empirical evaluation of three school-choice programmes in the US and 
finds positive effects in each case. In 1990, students in Milwaukee with low-income 
families were given vouchers to attend private schools if they wished. The schools these 
students currently attended therefore faced significant pressure to improve their 
standards in order to retain their pupils. Hoxby tests this hypothesis, using variation in 
the proportion of pupils with a voucher in the school to identify schools most affected by 
an increase in competition. Her results suggest that standards improved more in schools 
that faced more competition. To identify the effects of competition from charter schools 
in Michigan and Arizona, which passed charter school legislation in 1994, Hoxby uses a 
similar strategy. Results suggest that schools that face competition from a newly-opened 
charter school have a higher rate of productivity growth. These findings have been 
disputed by others, however.  
Bifulco and Ladd (2006) note that Hoxby’s analysis does not address the possibility that 
changes in the student composition of schools might confound the estimated effects of 
charter school competition. In another study of charter schools in Michigan, Bettinger 
(2005) finds no evidence that competition from charter schools improves the 
performance of students in traditional public schools. In their own analysis of the impact 
of charter schools in North Carolina, Bifulco and Ladd conclude that the new schools 
appear to have no statistically significant effects on the achievement of the traditional 
public school students. They emphasise, however, that the intensity of competition in this 
situation was not large, so their results should not be considered definitive.  
In the UK, Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2006) create indices of choice and competition and 
relate them to pupil achievement. Once they control for confounding factors (such as 
pupil sorting across schools), they find no evidence that attainment is higher for pupils 
enrolled in schools facing more competition. 
Hsieh and Urquiola (2002) find that the increase in competition in Chile led to no 
improvement in the performance of students on average. Their study compared districts 
that saw a large increase in the number of private schools with districts with only a small 
increase. The authors conclude that areas with more ‘choice’ saw no significant impact on 
the average test score of pupils. They also argue that the main impact of the school choice 
reforms was to increase segregation between schools, by virtue of a ‘massive exodus’ of 
parents of high socio-economic background who left the public school system.  
Böhlmark and Lindahl (2008) study the impact of Swedish reforms to the education 
system on pupils’ attainment in the short, medium and long terms. They find that an 
increase in the private school share of the municipality moderately improves short-term 
educational outcomes for pupils but has no significant impact on medium- or long-term 
educational outcomes. This evidence suggests there may be some benefits of competition 
but they are not sustained. 
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Despite the numerous studies available, there is no definitive evidence for the effects of 
school competition.33  
The provision of new schools has the potential to increase segregation in schools. Hsieh 
and Urquiola (2002) find that pupils attending voucher schools in Chile do not represent 
the local population, as the parents of pupils attending voucher schools were likely to 
have a higher socio-economic status than those in traditional schools. Björklund et al. 
(2005) find that parental education and immigrant status are correlated with private 
school attendance in Sweden, though only in the schools with a distinctive pedagogical 
profile (for example, Montessori schools). The Swedish National Agency for Education 
(2006) concludes that ‘choice in the school system has led to a tendency to segregate in 
terms of pupils’ sociocultural background, performance and ethnic background’ (p. 51). 
Gibbons and Telhaj (2007) show that although there are high levels of segregation by 
ability in the UK, the level of segregation since the expansion of school choice in the 
education system in England has not increased over time. Similarly, Gorard, Taylor and 
Fitz (2002) find that the expansion of school choice in the UK has not led less popular 
schools into a ‘spiral of decline’ characterised by declining pupil numbers and increasing 
proportions of disadvantaged pupils. Allen and Vignoles (2007) conclude that there was 
no ‘pervasive increase in segregation’ from 1989 to 2004, but that some local authorities 
(particularly in London) did experience an increase in segregation. 
Segregation is often discussed in terms of its impact on peer effects. Following our 
discussion of peer effects in Section 3.2, however, it is clear that why peer effects matter 
for attainment has not been resolved. It is plausible that additional resources for 
disadvantaged pupils may be enough to compensate for, or even create positive, peer 
effects in schools that would previously have had negative peer effects from low-attaining 
pupils. We must also account for the possible advantages of schools specialising in 
teaching disadvantaged pupils: Green Dot schools specialise in teaching disadvantaged 
pupils in Los Angeles and report great success;34 Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) 
schools mainly educate children from low-income families in the District of Columbia, 
with impressive results.35 
Summary of evidence on the impact of new schools  
It is likely that the creation of new schools will be encouraged under the Conservatives’ 
proposals to allow Swedish-style ‘free schools’ in the UK. Indeed, interest from groups of 
parents, teachers and charities has already been expressed. If schools must be non-profit, 
however, it is likely that fewer schools will be created and that the type of school will be 
different. Not-for-profit schools are more likely to be run by a group of individuals or 
charities and are less likely to expand. The interaction with the pupil premium policy, 
which provides higher funding for schools in disadvantaged areas, means that new 
schools are more likely (than without the pupil premium) to be established in 
disadvantaged communities. This has the potential to improve attainment in these areas 
through the benefit of school competition (the ‘rising tide’ argument), and therefore 
reduce the attainment gap between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils. The positive 
                                                                  
33See the debate between Hoxby and Rothstein at http://www.princeton.edu/~jrothst/hoxby/WSJ.pdf. 
34See http://www.greendot.org/results. 
35See http://www.kipp.org/about-kipp/results/annual-report-card. 
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effects of competition are not certain, however, as empirical disputes on the evidence 
have not been resolved.  
It is also possible that new schools will be created that could specialise in teaching 
disadvantaged communities. Although this has the potential to increase segregation 
between social groups, this may not necessarily widen the attainment gap. There are a 
number of examples from the US in which specialist schools have had great success in 
raising the attainment of disadvantaged pupils and closing the attainment gap.  
3.4 Summary  
The main aim of introducing the pupil premium is to narrow the attainment gap between 
rich and poor students. This chapter has outlined the mechanisms through which this aim 
may be achieved, and in each case has reviewed the empirical evidence.  
In Section 3.1, we assessed whether an increase in resources for schools with 
disadvantaged pupils would improve attainment in these schools. The conventional 
wisdom is that increasing educational resources has little or no impact on attainment. In 
contrast, we concluded that there is likely to be a small but positive effect; evidence from 
schools affected by the Excellence in Cities policy compared with a group of 
disadvantaged similar schools is especially encouraging. This effect has the potential to 
reduce the attainment gap between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils. We also 
discussed possible limitations to the pupil premium policy and noted that changes to the 
independence of schools – for example, in the way they are able to recruit and retain 
teachers – may have an impact on the effectiveness of extra resources.  
Evidence shows that the ability of a pupil’s peer group matters for their attainment. If the 
pupil premium improves the attainment of disadvantaged pupils, then all pupils in their 
peer group will gain, and the positive impact of the policy will be multiplied. There are 
also potential positive impacts if the pupil premium changes the distribution of pupils 
across schools. In Section 3.2, we examined whether the pupil premium was likely to 
reduce the level of social segregation across schools, either through a change in the type 
of pupils that schools want to attract or through a change in the type of schools to which 
parents apply. We concluded that the pupil premium may lead to a small reduction in 
covert selection by schools, but is unlikely to significantly reduce social segregation via 
this mechanism. Schools are unlikely to target disadvantaged pupils without a very large 
deprivation premium, and they are in any case limited to some extent by the School 
Admissions Code. Although parents may respond to large changes in schools’ academic 
performance, the type of school parents choose is likely to remain broadly the same.  
It is likely that the establishment of new schools will be encouraged under the 
Conservatives’ proposals to allow Swedish-style ‘free schools’ in the UK in conjunction 
with the pupil premium. Indeed, interest from groups of parents, teachers and charities 
has already been expressed. In Section 3.3, we assessed whether these new schools may 
improve the attainment of disadvantaged students, either through the pure effect of 
competition or through specialist schools with experience of teaching disadvantaged 
pupils. Unfortunately, the evidence on the beneficial impact of school choice is 
inconclusive, as some studies report positive effects while others refute them. It is 
possible that some new schools would be established in disadvantaged areas, although, 
without a ‘for-profit’ incentive, it is unlikely that the UK would see the same level of 
expansion as in other countries. We also find that an increase in the number of schools 
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may lead to an increase in the level of segregation between schools, but this may not be 
detrimental to disadvantaged pupils. Several chains of schools in the US specialise in 
teaching pupils in disadvantaged areas and have reported significant gains in attainment. 
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4. Empirical analysis of policy options 
Key findings 
• This chapter simulates a number of options for the pupil premium and then 
examines their likely impact on school finances. The results show the impact on the 
amount of ‘progressivity’ in the school funding system (i.e. the weighting of funding 
towards school-level measures of deprivation) and they document the range of 
winners and losers compared with the current system.  
• The policy options are grouped together according to whether they (1) supplement 
the existing system, (2) replace specific grants or (3) replace the entire system.  
• The options in the first category approximate current Liberal Democrat policy. Out 
of the options we consider, these reforms financially benefit schools the most and 
increase progressivity. However, funding must be found from other sources: the 
Liberal Democrats have proposed cutting tax credits to above-average-income 
families, as well as other areas of spending.  
• The second group of options replace specific grants from central government with a 
pupil premium. These options have a lower net cost and can be revenue-neutral, but 
at the same time they have the potential to create a vast number of significant 
losers.  
• We also consider the implementation of a single national funding formula, a 
seemingly radical option. However, the number of significant losers from 
implementing such a system could actually be much lower than through replacing 
specific grants alone.  
• More detailed analysis of a national funding formula illustrates a key problem with 
such a reform: the concentration of gains and losses across particular local 
authorities. This pattern does not appear to simply follow an urban/rural split; 
instead, it is likely to reflect local authority choices over central services, 
prioritisation of primary or secondary schools and historical factors.  
• To ease any transition to this sort of funding system, interim mechanisms that 
truncate large potential losses (and gains) could be imposed. The cost of such 
measures would be small relative to the total schools budget. For example, imposing 
a floor of 5% on schools’ annual real-terms losses and a ceiling of 15% on increases 
would enable one of the options to be phased in over five years, at an additional 
cost of £75 million per year (2010 prices). However, real-terms cuts of 5% are still 
likely to be painful for any school facing them; schools have become used to real-
terms increases. The only way to reduce such losses is through a permanent increase 
in school funding.  
 
This chapter simulates a number of options for the pupil premium and examines their 
likely impact on school finances. For each of the simulated options, we calculate the 
degree of ‘progressivity’ it would bring to the school funding system (i.e. the weighting of 
funding towards school-level measures of deprivation) and document the range of 
winners and losers.  
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This is the first comprehensive empirical analysis of a pupil premium system. As part of 
its proposals for a pupil premium, Policy Exchange undertook some limited modelling 
(see Freedman and Horner (2008)); however, the analysis here is more detailed and 
considers many more specific issues. 
We begin in Section 4.1 by considering some important design issues, and then Section 
4.2 outlines our data sources and methodology. In Section 4.3, we present empirical 
analysis of a number of hypothetical options for a pupil premium, some of which closely 
follow proposals from the Liberal Democrats and Policy Exchange. In Section 4.4, we 
conduct more detailed analysis of the winners and losers from a single national funding 
formula with a pupil premium – a long-term aspiration of the Conservatives – and discuss 
other issues such as transitional mechanisms.  
4.1 The design of a pupil premium 
Before any modelling can be carried out, it is important to examine a number of key 
issues relating to the design of a pupil premium. Specifically:  
• How would ‘disadvantaged’ pupils be classified?  
• At what level should the pupil premium be set?  
• What would the total cost of the policy be? 
• Would it replace any elements of the current school funding system? 
A position must be taken on each of the issues above in order to arrive at a pupil 
premium that can be modelled; by varying these parameters, we can examine a whole 
range of policies in detail. In our analysis, we present a menu of possible options, setting 
out the different assumptions we make in each case and why we make them. Here, we 
discuss the two main issues that informed our choice of policy options: how disadvantage 
should be measured and how generously it should be targeted by a pupil premium.  
Measures of disadvantage 
The primary aim of a pupil premium is to narrow the achievement gap between 
advantaged and disadvantaged pupils; a pupil premium should thus be targeted towards 
groups experiencing ‘educational disadvantage’. The most direct classification of 
disadvantage, therefore, would be any school where a large proportion of pupils fail to 
achieve good results. Unfortunately, this would create a perverse financial incentive for 
schools to perform badly. Whether or not schools would respond to such an incentive is 
unclear, but directly rewarding poor results seems to be unwise. Instead, one needs to 
use an indicator of deprivation that is a proxy for educational disadvantage. The question 
of which indicator to use here is similar to the economic question of which indicator of 
poverty to use for the purposes of income redistribution. This issue was addressed in a 
seminal article by Akerlof (1978), which listed three key characteristics of a good 
indicator. We adapt these criteria to an indicator of disadvantage as follows: 
• highly correlated with educational disadvantage; 
• difficult to manipulate by schools or pupils; 
• easily observable. 
There are a number of potential indicators that could be used that satisfy these criteria to 
varying degrees, including individual and geographic measures. These are discussed in 
detail in a number of publications by the Department for Children, Schools and Families 
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(DCSF).36 The recent report by the National Equality Panel (2010) provides a 
comprehensive picture of how educational attainment varies with many of these 
characteristics.  
However, it is important to remember that there is no objective or right answer to the 
question of which is the ideal indicator. Furthermore, not all sources of educational 
disadvantage may be appropriate targets for policy. For example, should policy target 
children living in well-off families whose parents have a negative attitude towards 
education? It is a moral question as to whether resources should just be targeted at those 
experiencing educational disadvantage as a result of material deprivation or due to 
special educational needs (SEN). Resources could also be targeted more widely, towards 
those experiencing disadvantage as a result of negative attitudes to education. We leave 
this as an open question, examining both proxy indicators for material deprivation and 
wider measures of educational disadvantage.37  
The most widely used indicator of material disadvantage for school children is eligibility 
for free school meals (FSM), which includes those who are eligible for them but do not 
take them up. This indicator is certainly highly correlated with educational disadvantage, 
as indicated in Chapter 1. In addition, schools should not, in principle, be able to falsely 
declare pupils as eligible for FSM if they are not eligible, as eligibility is based on the 
receipt of certain means-tested benefits.38 FSM eligibility is also easily observable in 
publicly-available administrative data. However, it is a rather blunt measure that cannot 
identify multiple degrees of deprivation. Furthermore, the take-up of relevant benefits is 
incomplete amongst families with children (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009), 
suggesting that there are a number of poor families with children that such an indicator 
might miss. It has also been found that schools do not always correctly identify all pupils 
eligible for FSM (Hobbs and Vignoles, 2009), which may limit its effectiveness (although 
the introduction of a pupil premium may well create an incentive for schools to improve 
reporting). Nevertheless, the FSM indicator is widely used, readily understood, relatively 
easy to observe and highly correlated with attainment. It has also been proposed by the 
Liberal Democrats as their preferred indicator of deprivation, and one of this 
Commentary’s aims is to analyse existing proposals as closely as possible. Therefore 
many of the options we present in our empirical analysis use eligibility for FSM as the 
main indicator of educational disadvantage.39 
Other potential individual-level indicators include having English as an additional 
language (EAL), belonging to a low-achieving ethnic minority group, and being identified 
as having special educational needs. All of these are associated with low levels of 
educational attainment. However, which ethnic groups have the lowest attainment varies 
across the different stages of schooling (see National Equality Panel (2010)), and using an 
indicator of membership of a low-achieving ethnic group on its own would certainly miss 
a number of low-achieving pupils from other ethnic groups. Although there are centrally 
defined criteria, SEN (without a statement) and EAL are in practice open to some 
                                                                  
36See http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/docbank/index.cfm?id=10254 and PwC (2009). 
37It is worth noting that the government currently uses a relatively wide description of additional educational 
needs (AEN) – for example, Home Environment, Communication and Interaction, and Behavioural, Emotional 
and Social Interaction.  
38See http://direct.gov.uk/en/Parents/Schoolslearninganddevelopment/SchoolLife/DG_4016089. 
39Another potential indicator is whether children have ever been eligible for free school meals, rather than just 
those eligible in any particular year. However, a problem with such an indicator is that any additional pupils 
captured may well just be those who are temporarily, rather than permanently, poor.  
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interpretation by schools; their use in a pupil premium could thus incentivise over-
reporting of these characteristics in order to receive extra money. However, they are 
proposed as indicators of educational disadvantage for a pupil premium by the Liberal 
Democrats and are widely used by many local authorities in their fair-funding formulae at 
present. We therefore also illustrate some options that feature additional payments for 
pupils with EAL or SEN without a statement. Recognising the perverse incentives that 
could be created by large premiums for these children, we keep these additions as small 
as possible. Pupils with statements of SEN are treated separately in our analysis: the level 
of additional funding for these pupils is fixed at existing levels.  
Another potential direct indicator of educational disadvantage is whether a child has low 
levels of prior attainment. For instance, secondary school pupils with low prior 
attainment could be defined as those who failed to achieve the expected level in their Key 
Stage 2 (KS2) tests, taken in the last year of primary school. Such a measure is easily 
observable, hard to manipulate (given that it is determined before secondary school) and 
clearly correlated with current educational achievement. In primary schools, however, 
the only corresponding indicator would be based on teacher assessments at Key Stage 1 
(KS1) or Foundation Stage Profiles. Unfortunately, KS1 tests are also taken in primary 
school and could therefore be susceptible to perverse incentives in order to increase 
funding. Foundation Stage Profiles, meanwhile, are still relatively new and their 
relationship with later achievement is poorly understood at present. Hence, low prior 
attainment seems an ideal indicator for secondary schools but a poor one for primary 
schools.40 Therefore, in one of the options analysed, we also allocate a premium to 
secondary schools for each pupil with low prior KS2 attainment, defined as failing to 
achieve Level 4 or above in Maths or English – the expected level in these subjects.41 In 
contrast to FSM eligibility, which focuses on material circumstances, this measure of 
disadvantage covers all children with low prior attainment, regardless of the reason for it, 
and is thus a wider measure of educational disadvantage.  
There is also a potential set of area-based indicators of disadvantage, including the Index 
of Multiple Deprivation (IMD)42 and an indicator based on tax credits recently developed 
by DCSF. The most recently available IMD index (2007) measures deprivation across a 
variety of ‘domains’, such as employment, education, health and housing. The tax credit 
indicator is a weighted average of the proportion of families within a Lower Super Output 
Area receiving different levels or elements of tax credits (for example, children in out-of-
work families receiving child tax credit, or children in working families receiving working 
tax credit and both elements of the child tax credit). This indicator was recently used by 
DCSF to allocate some elements of deprivation funding in the 2008–11 school funding 
settlement.  
Both of these indicators are correlated with educational attainment, easy to observe and 
difficult to falsify. However, area-based indicators are relatively broad: not every single 
child living in a deprived area will be disadvantaged, and not every single disadvantaged 
pupil will live in a deprived area. One particular advantage of the tax credit indicator is 
                                                                  
40Some pupils at middle schools may also sit KS2 tests, but we exclude these from our low attainment indicator 
for the same reason of avoiding perverse incentives. 
41Our measure of low KS2 attainment does not include Science, as it is no longer tested nationally during the 
KS2 assessments. As such, it may not be possible for secondary schools to know whether their pupils failed to 
achieve the expected level in that subject. 
42See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/ for 
more information. 
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that it may be able to capture families that are not eligible for free school meals but that 
nonetheless experience some level of material disadvantage. This would seem ideal for 
the wider pupil premium considered by the Liberal Democrats. However, the tax credit 
indicator is currently only available for 2005; it would thus miss changes in deprivation 
since then and, if not updated, would miss them in the future as well. Furthermore, it is 
not defined for all schools in our sample. Therefore, we do not use these indicators in our 
analysis, but accept them as potential alternative indicators to FSM eligibility. The tax 
credit indicator seems the better of the two, but to be used as part of a pupil premium this 
indicator would need to be updated more regularly.  
Finally, there is also a set of geo-demographic indicators such as MOSAIC (developed by 
Experian) and ACORN (developed by CACI). These indicators classify all postcodes into a 
number of types which share certain characteristics and behaviours based on the Census 
and other data. MOSAIC and ACORN data are often used by commercial firms for market 
research and a number of local authorities have begun using them in their fair-funding 
formulae. However, in order to use such indicators for a pupil premium, one needs to 
rank MOSAIC groups by some measure of educational disadvantage. As part of the design 
of its proposed pupil premium, Policy Exchange suggested allocating a pupil premium to 
MOSAIC types with the lowest average GCSE scores. A pupil premium with such a 
measure of disadvantage would be similar to the low prior attainment premium 
considered above. It would focus on all MOSAIC types with low average attainment, 
ignoring the source of such disadvantage, be it material or cultural factors.  
In order to analyse the policy proposal put forward by Policy Exchange, we will use a 
similar MOSAIC classification in some of our pupil premium options. The choice of 
MOSAIC over ACORN does not reflect any preference on our part, but simply reflects our 
desire to match Policy Exchange’s proposals as closely as possible in order to examine 
them in detail. We group the 61 MOSAIC types into six broader groups in the analysis, as 
shown in Table 4.1, with each one corresponding to a particular level of GCSE attainment. 
Under our options for a MOSAIC premium, schools receive a certain amount of extra 
funding for each pupil in one of the lowest three MOSAIC groups, with a greater weight 
placed on pupils in the lowest and second-lowest groups.  
One advantage of such an indicator is that it represents a more continuous way of 
targeting deprivation than allocating additional resources on the basis of FSM eligibility 
alone. Moreover, Webber and Butler (2007) have shown that MOSAIC groups are a 
stronger predictor of GCSE results than the IMD, which is not surprising since the former  
Table 4.1. MOSAIC groupings used in our analysis 
MOSAIC 
group 
Corresponding GCSE 
attainment 
Example GCSE grades
1 Less than 260 points 8 E grades (224 points)
2 260–279 points 8 D grades (272 points)
3 280–299 points 4 C grades and 4 D grades (296 points) 
4 300–319 points 6 C grades and 2 D grades (308 points) 
5 320–339 points 2 B grades and 6 C grades (332 points) 
6 340 points or above 8 B grades (368 points)
Notes: Based upon average GCSE points score among Year 11 pupils in England. GCSE points score used is the 
capped KS4 score (including equivalent qualifications) on the current points tariff. For more information, see 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/performancetables/nscoringsys.shtml. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using National Pupil Database for 2006–07 and 2007–08, along with matched 
MOSAIC records at postcode level. 
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are based on more disaggregated geographic units. However, the construction of MOSAIC 
types is a relatively complicated formulation, taking into account a wide range of 
information that may not be publicly available, which might inhibit the pupil premium’s 
simplicity and transparency.  
Level and cost of the pupil premium  
The evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggested that the direct impact of a pupil premium 
on educational attainment amongst disadvantaged children is likely to be positive but 
small. This suggests that the pupil premium would need to be very large indeed to 
completely close the achievement gap between rich and poor children. However, a 
relatively modest pupil premium that increased the level of funding weighted towards 
disadvantage could still help to narrow the gap, if one believes the evidence surrounding 
the direct impact of a pupil premium or if one believes it could have a positive, indirect 
impact via school admissions or new schools.  
When determining the level of the pupil premium under our various options, we are 
largely guided by either the proposed levels of additional spending (as with the first 
group of options) or the level of grants or funding they could replace (as with the second 
and third groups). For instance, the Liberal Democrats (2009) have stated that they 
would spend £2.5 billion on a pupil premium, with the money largely raised through cuts 
to tax credits for families with above-average incomes. If we assume that all of this money 
were spent on a very simple pupil premium that allocated a fixed amount of money to 
schools for every pupil eligible for FSM, then it would allow for an FSM premium of 
£2,400 (in 2010 prices). This is shown in Figure 4.1, which also shows the different levels 
of FSM premium one could attain with different levels of additional spending up to  
£5 billion. 
There is an argument for a higher disadvantaged pupil premium at primary level than at 
secondary level, on the grounds of early intervention to prevent attainment gaps between 
rich and poor from widening over time. Indeed, this is suggested by the Liberal 
Democrats. Figure 4.2 shows the FSM premiums that would be possible if one desired the 
FSM premium that primary schools received to be double the one that secondary schools 
received. A total budget of £2.5 billion would be able to finance a pupil premium of 
£3,000 at primary schools and £1,500 at secondary schools (2010 prices). In our analysis,  
Figure 4.1. Feasible FSM premium by total cost 
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Figure 4.2. Feasible FSM premium by total cost, with the primary FSM 
premium double the secondary FSM premium  
 
 
we present a number of options that vary the relative amount of the primary and 
secondary pupil premiums.43  
The second group of pupil premium options are funded through the abolition of specific 
grants. In this analysis, we recycle all such grants into a pupil premium, making the 
overall policy revenue-neutral. Finally, we also undertake a more speculative analysis (in 
the third group of options) that attempts to create a single national school funding 
formula – the long-term aspiration currently set out by the Conservative Party44 and 
proposed by Policy Exchange. Here, we set the pupil premium at a level that, at the very 
least, increases the weighting of funding towards deprivation. We are thus guided by how 
redistributive the present system is (i.e. present implicit FSM premiums), as well as by 
current average funding levels provided for pupils with EAL and for pupils in different 
age groups.  
Another potentially useful source of information is the recent survey of the costs of 
additional educational needs (AEN) undertaken for DCSF by PwC (2009). This surveyed 
schools and found that the current cost of AEN for schools was about £1,750 for all pupils 
with AEN (excluding those with high-cost SEN). However, this amount only referred to 
the part of the cost that could be met through current funding allocations. On top of this, 
it also found there to be an ‘unmet need’ of about £1,800 on average for each child with 
AEN (again excluding those with high-cost SEN) – that is, a cost that schools were unable 
to meet through their current levels of funding.  
                                                                  
43The feasible FSM premiums may change considerably in future, following the announcement (in the 
December 2009 Pre-Budget Report) of the extension of FSM eligibility to all primary school pupils in low-
income working families by 2011–12. This is expected to cover an additional 500,000 children. With a  
£2.5 billion budget, the feasible FSM premium would therefore be about £1,650 if applied equally to all pupils. 
If the FSM premium were twice as much for primary pupils as for secondary pupils, the feasible amounts would 
be £1,900 and £950 respectively. 
44Speech by Michael Gove, Shadow Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, 6 November 2009, 
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/11/Michael_Gove_A_comprehensive_programme_for_s
tate_education.aspx. 
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However, to estimate the cost of educating children with additional needs (either met or 
unmet), one needs to specify some objective for these children’s educational outcomes. 
The PwC estimated costs, for instance, do not measure the costs of closing the 
achievement gap. Instead, the ‘current cost’ measures the current level of spending on 
additional educational needs. As such, it is a useful reference for calculating how much 
should be allocated for such children if one were to replace aspects of current deprivation 
funding, but it is not useful in terms of calculating how high the pupil premium should be 
to significantly close the achievement gap. The ‘unmet need’ calculation is potentially 
informative, as it indicates the amount of money that schools would like to be able to 
spend on helping children with AEN. However, the concept of ‘unmet need’ is quite elastic 
and is not a measure of how much it would cost to actually narrow or close the 
achievement gap.  
Another issue is whether the pupil premium should be linear – that is, whether the 
assumption of a fixed cash amount for each disadvantaged pupil is sensible. This means 
that a school receives the same amount of additional funding for the first disadvantaged 
pupil as it does for the tenth, fiftieth and hundredth disadvantaged pupils. It may not be 
the case, however, that the ‘marginal cost’ of teaching disadvantaged pupils is constant: a 
school that currently has no disadvantaged pupils enrolled may have to incur costs to 
provide additional educational inputs when a disadvantaged pupil joins, whereas a school 
that already has such pupils will already have these structures in place. Linearity may not 
therefore be a realistic feature for the purposes of compensating schools for the costs of 
AEN. Nevertheless, it is retained throughout this chapter for simplicity and tractability. 
One last issue to consider is how the pupil premium would be set over time. If one fixed 
the total cost of the scheme (for example, at £2.5 billion adjusted for inflation), then the 
actual level of the pupil premium would necessarily vary over time, given that pupil 
numbers vary over time as do levels of deprivation (for example, the number of pupils 
eligible for FSM is likely to have increased during the recent recession). Such a scheme 
could create an undesirable level of uncertainty for schools. It would seem more sensible 
to fix the initial value of a pupil premium, and then allow the total cost to vary with pupil 
numbers or the level of deprivation. 
4.2 Data and methodology 
The analysis in this chapter is based on a combination of government and privately-
owned data sources. First, we use Section 52 returns45 to obtain a detailed picture of the 
actual financial resources and spending of all state schools in England. This data set also 
includes information on the source of a particular funding stream (LA formula funding, 
specific grants to schools and so forth), in order to break down total school resources by 
the type of funding, and is currently available up to 2008–09.46 
We combine Section 52 data with the National Pupil Database, collected and owned by 
DCSF. This is a collection of several pupil-level data sets, including information on 
national examination results at each Key Stage from 1 (age 7) to 5 (age 18), as well as a 
                                                                  
45For more information, see 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/everychildmatters/strategy/financeandfunding/informationforlocalauthorities/sectio
n52/section52. 
46We primarily make use of outturn table B, which is available up to 2008–09. Budget tables for individual 
schools are, however, available up to 2010–11.  
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database of pupil characteristics (such as ethnicity, gender and SEN status) for all pupils 
in English state schools. This latter file is known as the School Census, and is submitted by 
schools each term. We use the Spring Census, submitted in January, to measure school 
enrolment and the prevalence of various measures of AEN at each school (such as FSM 
and EAL). 
The latest Spring Census available to researchers was submitted in January 2008, 
pertaining to the 2007–08 academic year. We match these data to the 2008–09 Section 52 
outturn tables to reflect the fact that a school’s income in a given financial year is 
generally based on its pupil numbers during the preceding spring. We are also able to 
match the 2006–07 Spring Census to the 2007–08 Section 52 outturns. We add some 
information from EduBase – a DCSF administrative database of educational 
establishments – such as school type and school postcode. 
We also make use of MOSAIC socio-economic classifications,47 which assign each 
postcode in the UK to one of 61 ‘types’. This information was matched to the Spring 
Census in 2008 in order to facilitate analysis that replicates, and builds upon, the earlier 
research by Policy Exchange. In particular, it allows us to consider multiple measures of 
socio-economic disadvantage, including belonging to a low-achieving MOSAIC group. 
Combining the various data sources above allows us to calculate how much money 
schools currently receive in practice, as well as how much they would receive under 
various hypothetical configurations of a pupil premium. By comparing a school’s actual 
and hypothetical funding levels with its pupil characteristics, we are able to assess 
whether a specific policy increases the targeting of funds on deprivation and is therefore 
more ‘progressive’; we can also examine the spread and nature of any likely ‘winners and 
losers’ (in monetary terms). When examining such winners and losers, we generally use 
the number of schools losing at least 10% as a gauge of those experiencing large or 
significant losses; equally, we use the number of schools gaining at least 10% as a gauge 
of those experiencing large or significant gains. 
A fundamental assumption we make throughout this analysis is to hold the number of 
schools and pupils fixed while implementing the various policy options. In other words, 
our analysis does not take into account any possible responses to a pupil premium in 
terms of applications for school places, school admissions policies or the creation and 
closure of schools. While it may be desirable to allow for these mechanisms, doing so 
would require a model of school and parental decision-making, which is beyond the scope 
of this Commentary. We therefore model the financial impact only, holding the number of 
pupils (and their allocation across schools) constant. 
Some other assumptions have also been made in order to streamline and simplify our 
empirical analysis. First, the Area Cost Adjustment (ACA) has been maintained as it 
stands, to reflect variations in the costs of teacher recruitment and retention across 
different areas of the country. This means that the pupil premiums we calculate will be 
worth more to schools in high-cost areas. Other features of the funding system that we 
retain are the current level of Learning and Skills Council (LSC) funding for sixth-form 
pupils and the current level of funding for pupils with severe SEN. Finally, all 
discretionary budget adjustments (such as corrections following an earlier overpayment 
or underpayment of funds) have also been retained. 
                                                                  
47See http://www.experian.co.uk/www/pages/what_we_offer/products/mosaic_uk.html for more 
information. 
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Having made these initial assumptions, we outline the various combinations of 
parameters that we use to characterise a specific pupil premium option. The main 
measure of deprivation in this analysis is FSM (leading to an ‘FSM premium’). Some of the 
options below also consider implementing MOSAIC premiums, as well as a premium 
based on low prior attainment at Key Stage 2. The FSM premiums are implemented by 
giving each school a cash amount for each FSM pupil, the low KS2 premiums are allocated 
in a similar fashion, while the MOSAIC premium is implemented as a set of three 
additional payments, one for pupils in each of the lowest three MOSAIC groups. 
Second, the relative sizes of the premiums between primary and secondary pupils need to 
be defined. There may be parity, where the FSM premium is the same for both types of 
pupil; alternatively, the FSM premium might be greater for primary pupils in an attempt 
to redirect financial resources towards younger children in poverty, or vice versa. The 
policies analysed below contain a mixture of these combinations. Other elements of 
funding that can be specified in order to make the model more comprehensive include 
premiums for other dimensions of AEN, such as EAL and non-statemented SEN.48  
When we examine the creation of a single national funding formula, we must also provide 
base amounts for pupils in different Key Stages, based on the current system of Age-
Weighted Pupil Units (AWPUs). We choose to use the average AWPU ratios across local 
authorities in England. We also include a fixed cost element49 – a cash amount given to 
schools irrespective of their size. This provides a way of compensating smaller schools 
(which typically have very high income per pupil under the current system) for the loss of 
resources that they might otherwise incur from a national system of per-pupil funding. 
4.3 Policy options 
As stated above, the pupil premium options we consider can be grouped under three 
broad headings, each specifying how they would relate to the current system and how 
they would be funded. First, a pupil premium may simply be implemented on top of the 
current funding system, and therefore funded from outside the Schools Budget. This 
funding model generally corresponds to the current Liberal Democrat proposals and 
provides a starting point for our analysis. Alternatively, a pupil premium could replace 
some elements of the funding system, such as specific grants from central 
government, and be either revenue-neutral or require additional funds. Lastly, a pupil 
premium could replace the entire funding system – this is obviously a more radical 
approach and any analysis of this would be purely speculative. However, it would shed 
light on the question ‘what price simplicity?’ and outline the implications for each school 
of moving to a single national funding formula. This last version was proposed by a Policy 
Exchange report and is a long-term aspiration of the Conservative Party.  
Table 4.2 lists the specific examples of each of these three different options that we 
consider, together with the deprivation measures used, whether there are any additional 
payments for EAL and non-statemented SEN, and the total additional cost (in 2010  
                                                                  
48The EAL premium can be modelled in two ways: one is to provide a certain amount of extra money for each 
pupil with EAL, while the other is to provide this money but only for one year. The latter approach, which is 
the one taken in this chapter, reflects the idea that pupils entering the school system with a foreign first 
language may face initial educational disadvantages, but may then naturally catch up with their peers over 
time. 
49This is implemented as the constant in a regression of total funding on a series of school characteristics, 
which is done separately for primary and secondary schools. See Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
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Table 4.2. List of options analysed in this chapter 
Policy type 
(method of funding) 
Deprivation 
measures 
Additional 
payments for 
EAL and SEN 
Additional 
cost 
(£ billion) 
1. In addition to current funding 
Option 1a FSM No 2.5 
Option 1b FSM Yes 2.5 
Option 1c FSM, MOSAIC Yes 3.5 
2. Replacement for specific grants 
Option 2a FSM No 0
Option 2b MOSAIC No 1
3. Single national funding formula 
Option 3a FSM Yes 0
Option 3b MOSAIC Yes 1
Option 3c FSM, low KS2 Yes 1
 
prices). Table 4.3 at the end of this section summarises the results and distributional 
effects of these options.  
In addition to current funding 
The pupil premiums considered in this subsection are on top of the current system and 
therefore require additional spending. At first, we consider a budget of an extra £2.5 
billion – the total cost proposed by the Liberal Democrats for their pupil premium. 
Option 1a. Pure FSM premium only, with parity 
Measure of deprivation FSM
FSM premium (primary/secondary)  £2,400/£2,400
EAL premium (primary/secondary)  £0
SEN premium (primary/secondary)  £0
Additional cost  £2.5 billion
 
In this very simple case, the additional £2.5 billion is spent only on extra money for FSM-
eligible pupils. There are no other measures of deprivation or AEN taken into account and 
no differentiation in the FSM premium between primary and secondary pupils. 
A budget of £2.5 billion devoted purely to an FSM premium means that, in 2008–09, each 
school would have received an additional £2,400 for each pupil eligible for FSM (in 2010 
prices). Note that this would be on top of any implicit FSM premiums from current 
deprivation funding. Clearly, no school would be made worse off, as the policy consists of 
additional money on top of existing funding.  
Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of primary schools (dark grey line) and secondary 
schools (light grey line) that experience increases in their funding of less than a given 
value. The horizontal axis starts at zero since none of the schools sees a fall in its funding 
level. Reading across to the vertical axis shows the proportion of schools experiencing a 
change in funding per pupil of a given amount (shown on the horizontal axis) or less. The 
dashed black vertical line at 10% on the horizontal axis is a threshold that defines, for our 
purposes, a ‘significant’ increase in funding; all schools on the graph to the right of this  
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Figure 4.3. Cumulative distribution of gains and losses in 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
line can be thought of as significant winners. This vertical line meets the dark grey line at 
a value of 67% (indicated by the lower horizontal dashed line) and the light grey line at a 
value of 82% (indicated by the upper horizontal dashed line) on the vertical axis. This 
means that two-thirds of primary schools would experience gains of less than 10%, while 
the same is true for 82% of secondary schools. As a result, a third of primary schools 
would receive funding increases of at least 10%, compared with 18% of secondary 
schools. This policy would thus lead to more large gains (in relative terms) amongst 
primary schools than amongst secondary schools. 
While Figure 4.3 sheds light on the overall gains across the state school system, it does 
not say anything about which schools gain the most. Specifically, we are interested in how 
progressive the policy would be. Since this policy targets FSM alone, deprived schools 
would necessarily receive a larger boost to their resources, while schools with no 
deprived pupils (in terms of FSM) would receive no increase in funding. To confirm, we 
break down the gains in Figure 4.3 by the level of school deprivation, and then compare 
the gains in less disadvantaged schools with those in more disadvantaged schools. 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present separate decile charts for primary and secondary schools. 
These split schools up into 10 groups of equal size based on the proportion of their pupils 
that are eligible for FSM. The schools in the first decile are the most disadvantaged, while 
those in decile 10 are the most affluent.50 
In both graphs, the dark grey bars represent baseline funding per pupil – that is, the 
actual amount of funding received in 2008–09 divided by the actual number of enrolled 
pupils. This is higher in more disadvantaged schools (the lower decile groups), reflecting 
the progressivity and deprivation targeting that currently exist. The light grey bars give 
the counterfactual amounts, i.e. the simulated funding per pupil under this policy option. 
Unsurprisingly, the very most deprived schools gain the most: among these, primaries 
and secondaries would both experience an increase of roughly £1,000 per pupil under 
                                                                  
50Note that the deciles are designed so that the total number of pupils at schools in each decile is the same for 
each decile. This means that the number of schools in each decile will vary.  
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this policy. The right-hand axis displays this change in percentage terms, indicating that 
the extra £1,000 amounts to a relative increase of 23% for the primary schools and 16% 
for the secondary schools. 
Moving across both graphs, we see that the gains dwindle in both absolute and relative 
terms, as schools that are less deprived will inevitably have fewer FSM-eligible pupils to 
attract the premium. At the right-hand end of the graphs, the schools with the most 
affluent pupil enrolments are almost unaffected by this policy: having very few FSM-
eligible pupils, they receive funding increases of less than 1%. The policy clearly increases 
the amount of progressivity in the funding system. Such an outcome was inevitable, given 
the structure of the policy.  
It is also the case that primary schools are the largest beneficiaries of this policy: they 
receive the same pupil premium as secondary schools, but have lower baseline levels of 
funding, and thus experience a greater relative increase in resources.  
Figure 4.4. Decile chart for primary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
Figure 4.5. Decile chart for secondary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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Option 1b. FSM premium, primary double secondary, with additional amounts 
for EAL and SEN 
Measure of deprivation FSM
FSM premium (primary/secondary) £2,740/£1,370
EAL premium (primary/secondary) £140/£140
SEN premium (primary/secondary) £140/£140
Additional cost  £2.5 billion
 
The next option we consider has been chosen as the closest approximation to the Liberal 
Democrat proposals for a pupil premium.51 The £2.5 billion costing is retained, but the 
FSM premium for primary pupils is now double the premium for secondary pupils, 
reflecting the Liberal Democrats’ emphasis on providing more resources for younger 
children. Furthermore, the Liberal Democrats have stated that the pupil premium should 
cover pupils with low-level or medium SEN (which we interpret as pupils with non-
statemented SEN) and those with EAL (in their first year of EAL). We have set additional 
premiums for each of these pupils worth 10% of the secondary FSM premium. Setting 
these at a relatively low value reflects the fact that high values might create too strong an 
incentive for schools to over-report these characteristics. With these changes in place, the 
£2.5 billion budget now allows for an FSM premium of £2,740 for primary pupils and 
£1,370 for secondary pupils (both rounded to the nearest £10); the ‘add-ons’ for EAL and 
non-statemented SEN are thus about £140 each.  
By adding premiums for EAL and non-statemented SEN, less of the budget remains to 
fund the FSM premium. At the same time, the relativity of the FSM premium has been  
Figure 4.6. Cumulative distribution of gains and losses in 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
                                                                  
51Note that the Liberal Democrats have proposed to vary the pupil premium across local authorities, which has 
not been done in this Commentary. They have also proposed to allocate a pupil premium to children in care. 
We were not able to model this proposed premium as the number of children in care at each school is not 
available to researchers within the National Pupil Database or Spring Census. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
pr
op
or
ti
on
 o
f 
sc
ho
ol
s
% change in funding per pupil
Option 1b. FSM premium plus EAL and SEN add-ons,
primary FSM premium double secondary (£2.5 bn)
Primary Secondary
The pupil premium: assessing the options 
54 
changed dramatically in favour of primary schools under this option. As a result, primary 
schools have the potential to gain more than previously, whereas secondary schools tend 
to gain less. As shown in Figure 4.6, whilst 40% of all primary schools would see their 
funding grow by 10% or more, only 4% of secondary schools would experience similar 
gains. Instead, almost three-quarters of secondaries would have their income boosted by 
less than 5%. Of course, it is still the case that no school loses out, as the policy 
supplements the existing funding that schools receive. 
The decile charts in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 reinforce the fact that the policy is still a 
progressive one for both primary and secondary schools, but that the extra resources are 
skewed in favour of the former. The most disadvantaged primary schools would see their  
Figure 4.7. Decile chart for primary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
Figure 4.8. Decile chart for secondary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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funding per pupil increase by over a quarter, whereas the most disadvantaged 
secondaries would only receive a 10% increase. It remains the case that the most affluent 
schools (both primary and secondary) would be largely unaffected by the policy. 
Option 1c. FSM and MOSAIC premiums with additional amounts for EAL and 
SEN  
Measures of deprivation FSM, MOSAIC
MOSAIC premium (groups 1–3) £1,110/£740/£180
FSM premium (primary/secondary) £2,230/£1,110
EAL premium (primary/secondary) £110/£110
SEN premium (primary/secondary) £110/£110
Additional cost  £3.5 billion
 
The Liberal Democrats have also stated that they would like to expand the pupil premium 
in future to cover pupils who are not eligible for FSM but who still experience some level 
of disadvantage. They have not stated which measure of deprivation they would use for 
such a pupil premium, nor how much it would cost, but they have said that they would 
consider using the tax credit indicator or MOSAIC (Liberal Democrats, 2009). Given the 
problems with the former (described in Section 4.1), we choose to consider an option 
involving MOSAIC, with an additional £1 billion of spending. This policy option thus 
illustrates the effects of using a broader measure of deprivation (MOSAIC) in conjunction 
with a simple binary measure (FSM), financed by an extra £1 billion. The policy is the 
same as the previous one but with the added feature that schools now receive an 
additional premium for each pupil in MOSAIC groups 1, 2 or 3. This deprivation measure 
has a much wider coverage than FSM: while just over 1 million pupils in the 2007–08 
Spring Census data were eligible for FSM, more than 2.7 million pupils fell into the lowest 
three MOSAIC groups. Adding another measure of deprivation on which to target 
resources – for which an extra 1.7 million pupils would qualify – inevitably leaves less 
money available for an FSM premium (as well as the EAL and non-statemented SEN add-
ons). However, the additional spending of £1 billion helps to prevent the FSM premium 
from falling too much; moreover, children eligible for FSM and also in the first or second 
MOSAIC group would receive more than they did under Option 1b. 
The budget of £3.5 billion is now enough to afford an FSM premium of £2,230 in primary 
schools (£1,110 in secondary schools), and therefore EAL and non-statemented SEN add-
ons of £110. The MOSAIC premiums are set on a sliding scale in order to be progressive, 
with the relativities chosen such that the premium for MOSAIC group 1 is equal to the 
secondary FSM premium, while the one for MOSAIC group 2 is two-thirds of that (£740) 
and the one for MOSAIC group 3 is a sixth of the one for MOSAIC group 1 (£180). This is 
the same set of relative weights used in the Policy Exchange proposals.  
Figure 4.9 reveals the new spread of gains from the policy, which, with an extra £1 billion 
to spend, are now potentially higher for both primary and secondary schools. Half of 
primary schools would be significant winners (seeing an increase in funding of at least 
10%), while a quarter of primaries would receive an increase of at least 20%. Just under 
30% of secondary schools would be significant winners under this policy option. For the 
same reasons as above, no schools are net losers. 
The decile charts in Figures 4.10 and 4.11 confirm that the policy is progressive, with 
very small gains among the most affluent schools and very significant gains among the  
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Figure 4.9. Cumulative distribution of gains and losses in 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
poorest schools. The most deprived primary schools receive a boost to their income of 
just over 30%, while the poorest secondaries receive an increase of approximately 14%. 
One qualitative difference that does emerge from these figures is that, in both cases, the 
black line is straighter than before, particularly between deciles 2 and 4. This means that 
schools in these deciles – those with moderate levels of deprivation – receive 
considerably larger increases than under option 1a or 1b, and are therefore brought 
closer to the funding levels received by schools in decile 1. This is attributable to the 
MOSAIC premium, which provides deprivation funding with much wider coverage than 
the FSM premium alone. 
Figure 4.10. Decile chart for primary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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Figure 4.11. Decile chart for secondary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
Summary of options in addition to current funding 
A pupil premium implemented on top of the current system would naturally increase the 
progressivity of school funding, and there would be no losers from such a policy. The total 
additional cost of the scheme proposed by the Liberal Democrats is £2.5 billion. In this 
subsection, we considered two ways of financing a pupil premium with that budget. One 
(option 1a) had a flat-rate FSM premium across primary and secondary schools (£2,400 
per pupil), leading to larger relative gains amongst primary schools due to their lower 
initial baseline funding. Option 1b, which is more in line with the Liberal Democrats’ 
proposal, focused more on primary schools than secondary schools (on the grounds of 
early intervention) and included ‘add-ons’ for pupils with EAL and non-statemented SEN. 
These first two policies are based on the FSM indicator and therefore focus resources 
particularly at the most deprived 10% of primary and secondary schools. However, we 
have also shown, in option 1c, how providing extra premiums for pupils in low-achieving 
MOSAIC groups could spread the gains further amongst schools in the second, third and 
fourth deciles of deprivation, though here it is at the cost of an extra £1 billion.  
The main problem with all of these schemes is that they require additional levels of 
spending, which will be difficult to fund given the current fiscal outlook. The Liberal 
Democrats have proposed funding their scheme mostly through cuts to tax credits paid to 
families with above-average incomes. Nevertheless, it seems wise to consider alternative 
options that are revenue-neutral or involve smaller increases in additional spending.  
Replacement for specific grants 
In this section, we consider pupil premium options under a different funding model: 
instead of providing wholly additional spending, the funding comes from scrapping all 
specific grants that schools currently receive from central government and redistributing 
the money as a pupil premium. These payments – such as the School Standards Grant 
(SSG), School Development Grant (SDG) and Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant (EMAG) 
– amounted to roughly £4.6 billion in total in 2008–09. While this is a larger figure with 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
£0
£1,000
£2,000
£3,000
£4,000
£5,000
£6,000
£7,000
£8,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fu
nd
in
g 
pe
r 
pu
pi
l
Decile group
Option 1c. FSM and MOSAIC premiums plus EAL and SEN add-
ons, primary FSM premium double secondary (£3.5 bn)
Baseline Counterfactual % change (RH axis)
The pupil premium: assessing the options 
58 
which to finance a pupil premium than in our previous scheme, the loss of specific grants 
for some schools may not be fully compensated by the pupil premium.  
The first option we consider is revenue-neutral. Such a policy invariably represents a 
zero-sum game: the total amount that any schools win from the policy will be exactly 
offset by the total amount that any schools lose. The second option uses additional 
spending of £1 billion in an attempt to minimise the number of losers.  
Option 2a. FSM premium with secondary premium double primary 
Measure of deprivation FSM
FSM premium (primary/secondary)  £3,060/£6,130
EAL premium (primary/secondary)  £0/£0
SEN premium (primary/secondary)  £0/£0
Additional cost  £0 billion
 
First, it is important to note that specific grants currently represent an important source 
of income for deprived secondary schools (see Chapter 2), and that a pupil premium that 
replaced these grants could penalise these schools (without some sort of compensating 
adjustment). Therefore, in this option, we set the secondary FSM premium to be double 
the primary one. Replacing specific grants with such a pupil premium gives a primary 
FSM premium of £3,060 and a secondary FSM premium of £6,130 (2010 prices). 
Figure 4.12 shows the spread of winners and losers from such a policy. As the policy must 
be revenue-neutral, there are many schools that are net losers: only 30% of primary 
schools and 43% of secondary schools would see an improvement in their financial 
position. Such figures illustrate that setting the secondary FSM premium at double the 
primary seems to penalise primary schools. Around one in four primaries would see large 
losses of 10% or more, while only one in ten would receive large increases (of 10% or 
more). Approximately 40% of secondaries would see smaller changes in their funding 
(gains or losses of less than 5%), whereas around one in seven secondaries would be 
significant winners and about one in ten significant losers.  
Figure 4.12. Cumulative distribution of gains and losses in 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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Even though some schools lose from the policy, the decile charts in Figures 4.13 and 4.14 
show that this policy would be highly progressive amongst both primary and secondary 
schools. The most deprived primary schools would see an increase in funding of just over 
13%, while the most affluent ones would see a reduction of a similar magnitude. The 
most disadvantaged secondary schools would see increases in funding of approximately 
20%, while the affluent ones would lose around 10% on average. 
Figure 4.13. Decile chart for primary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
Figure 4.14. Decile chart for secondary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
-£3,000
-£2,000
-£1,000
£0
£1,000
£2,000
£3,000
£4,000
£5,000
£6,000
£7,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fu
nd
in
g 
pe
r 
pu
pi
l
Decile group
Option 2a. FSM plus EAL and SEN add-ons, secondary premium 
double primary (£0 bn)
Baseline Counterfactual % change (RH axis)
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
-£3,000
-£2,000
-£1,000
£0
£1,000
£2,000
£3,000
£4,000
£5,000
£6,000
£7,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fu
nd
in
g 
pe
r 
pu
pi
l
Decile group
Option 2a. FSM plus EAL and SEN add-ons, secondary premium 
double primary (£0 bn)
Baseline Counterfactual % change (RH axis)
The pupil premium: assessing the options 
60 
Option 2b. Pure MOSAIC premium with £1 billion additional funding 
Measure of deprivation MOSAIC
MOSAIC premium (groups 1–3)  £4,140/£2,730/£660
FSM premium (primary/secondary)  £0/£0
EAL premium (primary/secondary)  £0/£0
SEN premium (primary/secondary)  £0/£0
Additional cost  £1 billion
 
Option 2b uses a different measure of deprivation (MOSAIC) which is applied equally to 
primary and secondary school pupils. For consistency, this policy option uses the same 
relativities for the MOSAIC premium as proposed by Policy Exchange.52 We have also 
added £1 billion of extra funding from outside the Schools Budget in an attempt to 
provide some additional compensation for the loss of specific grants. With a new budget 
of approximately £5.6 billion, the feasible MOSAIC premiums are £4,140, £2,730 and 
£660 for groups 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
Figure 4.15 shows the distribution of gains and losses arising from this policy. Since the 
MOSAIC premium is applied equally to primary and secondary schools, and replaces a 
funding source that was important for deprived secondary schools, it is not surprising 
that primary schools generally gain more than secondary schools. Nearly half of primary 
schools are net winners, compared with about 40% of secondary schools. Approximately 
20% of secondary schools and 30% of primary schools would be significant winners. 
However, there are still a number of significant losers: nearly a quarter of primary 
schools and a seventh of secondary schools would experience falls of 10% or worse. 
Figure 4.15. Cumulative distribution of gains and losses in 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
                                                                  
52This policy option is similar to the approximate modelling undertaken by Policy Exchange as part of its policy 
proposal. However, there are some slight differences in the specific grants used to fund the pupil premium and 
the additional level of spending. Another difference is that we have not reallocated funds currently reported as 
being allocated on the basis of additional educational needs.  
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The decile charts in Figures 4.16 and 4.17 illustrate the distributional effect of using a 
broader measure of deprivation such as MOSAIC. As was the case under option 1c, using a 
wider degree of coverage means that schools with moderate levels of deprivation (such 
as those in deciles 3 and 4) can also see considerable increases in their funding. On 
average, primary schools in deciles 1 and 2 both receive an increase of 20% in their 
funding per pupil. Although schools in decile 2 would be expected to receive less MOSAIC 
funding, they may also be less reliant on specific grants, leading them to benefit just as 
much from the policy as the very poorest schools. The most affluent four deciles are, on 
average, net losers, with those in the top decile seeing a 9% fall in income. 
Figure 4.16. Decile chart for primary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
Figure 4.17. Decile chart for secondary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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Importantly, the most deprived secondary schools are not the biggest winners amongst 
secondary schools. It is in fact schools in the second decile which gain the most, on 
average. This reflects the fact that secondary schools in the poorest decile are highly 
dependent on specific grants, so their net gains are small when a measure of 
disadvantage that does not target severe deprivation is used. As was previously the case 
with a MOSAIC premium (options 1b and 1c), schools with moderate levels of deprivation 
tend to gain significantly, with those in deciles 2 to 4 being net winners, while those in 
decile 5 are generally unaffected. Secondary schools in deciles 6 and above lose out on 
average, with the most affluent ones losing the same amount (in relative terms) as the 
most affluent primary schools. 
Summary of options replacing specific grants 
The creation of a pupil premium through the abolition of specific grants from central 
government may seem to be an appealing idea, as it provides a less expensive route 
towards a pupil premium. However, it is important to remember that deprived secondary 
schools are more dependent on such grants, and could thus lose out more through their 
abolition unless sufficiently compensated. Moreover, even with a pupil premium at 
secondary schools double that at primary schools, or when adding £1 billion of additional 
spending, there are still significant numbers of schools that lose at least 10% of their 
budget. Implementing such a policy, even over a long time frame, is unlikely to be easy.  
Single national funding formula 
This section presents the most radical set of policy options, all of which replace both LA 
formula funding and specific grants.53 In 2008–09, state schools in England received a 
total of £26.6 billion from LA formula income, which, combined with the money for 
specific grants, gives a total pupil premium budget of about £31.1 billion. The first option 
presented here is revenue-neutral; the other two involve an additional £1 billion of 
spending from elsewhere. Such an increase would represent a 3.2% increase in school 
funding. However, this could be assumed to take place over a longer period than just a 
single year.  
Some other features have to be incorporated in these pupil premium options in order to 
compensate schools for the loss of LA formula income. Under all the options in this 
section, schools receive a fixed amount of per-pupil funding that varies by pupil age 
according to predefined AWPU ratios. These ratios are set so that schools receive the 
same amount for each KS1 and KS2 pupil (ages 4–7 and 7–11), but 30% extra for each 
KS3 pupil (age 11–14) and 55% extra for each KS4 pupil (age 14–16).54 These ratios, 
combined with the overall budget constraint, will then pin down the specific cash 
amounts that schools receive per pupil at each Key Stage. Note that these will be base 
per-pupil amounts, and any pupil premiums for deprivation or AEN will be paid to 
schools on top of them. 
                                                                  
53As with all of the analysis in this chapter, ACA factors, statemented SEN funding and discretionary budget 
adjustments are still retained at their existing levels. 
54These AWPU ratios are roughly equal to the average AWPU ratios (across all local authorities in England) 
used in setting per-pupil formula funding. 
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For all the policy options considered here, schools also receive a fixed monetary amount 
that represents an imputed adjustment for fixed costs.55 This is designed not only to 
cover some of the actual operating fixed costs that schools may face, but also to prevent 
smaller schools – for which fixed costs are very important relative to per-pupil 
operational costs – from suffering very large reductions in per-pupil funding. 
Option 3a. Differential FSM premium with additional amounts for EAL and 
SEN 
Base per-pupil amount (KS 1/2/3/4) £2,460/£2,460/£3,200/£3,810 
Measure of deprivation FSM
FSM premium (primary/secondary) £3,690/£4,920 
EAL premium (primary/secondary) £250/£250 
SEN premium (primary/secondary) £250/£250 
Additional cost  £0 billion
 
The first option we consider here is an FSM premium to be paid on top of the basic per-
pupil amount (defined by the AWPU ratios). Recognising that the current school funding 
system is weighted more strongly towards deprivation at secondary schools, we 
implement a secondary FSM premium that is 33% greater than that at primary schools in 
order to minimise the number of losers. We also include some ‘add-ons’ for EAL and non-
statemented SEN. With a budget of just over £31 billion, the feasible payments are £2,460 
for each KS1 or KS2 pupil, £3,200 for KS3 pupils and £3,810 for KS4 pupils. On top of 
these amounts, primary schools receive an extra £3,690 for each FSM pupil and 
secondary schools an extra £4,920. There are also additional amounts of £250 for pupils 
with EAL or non-statemented SEN. 
Figure 4.18. Cumulative distribution of gains and losses in 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
                                                                  
55This is calculated as the constant in a regression of primary and secondary schools’ LA formula income on a 
number of school-level characteristics. The imputed amounts are £125,000 for a primary school and £215,000 
for a secondary school. See Table A.2 in the Appendix.  
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Figure 4.18 shows the spread of winners and losers from such a policy. It is clear that 
primary schools and secondary schools are treated very differently under this option. 
Secondary schools are much more likely to suffer losses in income – 60% of them are net 
losers, compared with only about 40% of primary schools. Even though secondary 
schools receive a higher base amount per pupil (by virtue of the AWPU ratios), these 
amounts are similar to their existing AWPU allocations and therefore do not bring in 
enough extra resources to compensate secondary schools for the loss of specific grants. 
As a result, while there is a wide dispersion in outcomes, primary schools generally fare 
better than secondaries under this policy: 20% of them experience large gains (10% or 
more of their current funding), compared with only 7% of secondary schools. However, it 
is worth noting that the numbers of significant losers are fairly similar, and are much 
lower than for the previous options that replaced specific grants only.  
The decile charts in Figures 4.19 and 4.20 reinforce the difference in fortunes between 
primary and secondary schools. The policy appears quite progressive among primaries, 
with growth in income of approximately 8% among the most disadvantaged schools 
while the most affluent see hardly any change in their funding. On average, primary 
schools in all but the richest decile gain from the policy, though clearly some deciles gain 
more than others. However, in Figure 4.20, we see that while the policy is clearly 
progressive for secondary schools, on average they are actually worse off across all but 
the poorest decile. While the losses are smallest for schools in the second to fifth deciles, 
the richest secondaries do incur losses of over 5%, on average. The fact that secondary 
schools fare worse under this policy is not inherent to a single national funding formula; 
it simply reflects the parameter values we have chosen.  
Figure 4.19. Decile chart for primary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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Figure 4.20. Decile chart for secondary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
Option 3b. MOSAIC premium with additional amounts for EAL and SEN, plus 
an extra £1 billion 
Base per-pupil amount (KS 1/2/3/4) £2,330/£2,330/£3,030/£3,610 
Measure of deprivation MOSAIC
MOSAIC premium (groups 1–3) £4,660/£3,100/£770 
FSM premium (primary/secondary) £0/£0
EAL premium (primary/secondary) £230/£230 
SEN premium (primary/secondary) £230/£230 
Additional cost  £1 billion
 
In this policy option, we replace the above FSM premium with a MOSAIC premium. This is 
our closest version to the single national funding formula envisaged by Policy Exchange. 
As per the Policy Exchange proposal, the relative MOSAIC weights are set such that the 
bottom MOSAIC group receives six times the amount allocated to MOSAIC group 3, and 
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additional payments for EAL and non-statemented SEN are held at 10% of the base per-
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small amount of education spending outside the Schools Budget and redirecting it 
towards a pupil premium to minimise the number of losers. To accommodate this feature 
in our policy option, we add an extra £1 billion of spending, bringing the total budget to 
just over £32 billion.  
The MOSAIC indicator has much wider coverage and more pupils are eligible for the 
premium; thus there is less money available for the other features of the policy option, 
despite the extra spending. With the same level of additional spending as before (option 
2b), the base per-pupil amounts are now £2,330 for KS1 and KS2 pupils, £3,030 for KS3 
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Figure 4.21. Cumulative distribution of gains and losses in 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
and £770 respectively for groups 1, 2 and 3, while the add-ons for EAL and non-
statemented SEN are worth £230. 
Figure 4.21 displays the implications of this policy for the overall spread of gains and 
losses. As was the case for option 3a, secondary schools are generally not fully 
compensated for their lost income sources and are more likely to be net losers than 
primary schools (57% versus 34%). About 12% of primaries would see a fall in income of 
at least 10%, yet nearly 40% of primaries would experience an increase in funding of the 
same magnitude. However, about one in five secondary schools would lose 10% or more 
of their budget under such a scheme, and a similar number would see large gains (of 10% 
or more).  
Figure 4.22 assesses the progressivity of this policy option for primary schools. The black 
percentage change line displays the sort of pattern that tends to arise under a MOSAIC 
premium as in option 2b. The largest increases in resources occur among schools with 
moderate levels of deprivation, which have less to lose from the scrapping of specific 
grants and now receive some deprivation funding that they would not have attracted 
before. Nevertheless, the most deprived primaries do see, on average, an increase in 
funding of about 12%, while those in the richest deciles see, on average, little change in 
overall funding. The policy is mostly progressive amongst primary schools.  
Figure 4.23 reveals a less positive picture for secondary schools: the most deprived ones, 
for which specific grants were a particularly important income source, actually lose about 
3%, on average – only the most affluent 30% of schools would see a worse reduction in 
income. Meanwhile, the only beneficiaries, on average, from this policy option seem to be 
secondaries in deciles 2 to 5 – those with moderate levels of deprivation. 
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Figure 4.22. Decile chart for primary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
Figure 4.23. Decile chart for secondary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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SEN premium (primary/secondary) £240/£240 
Additional cost  £1 billion
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In this final policy option, we return to an FSM premium paid on top of the basic per-pupil 
amount (defined by the AWPU ratios), plus some ‘add-ons’ for EAL and non-statemented 
SEN. To this we also add a low prior attainment premium for secondary schools. This is 
allocated to secondary schools for each pupil who did not achieve the expected level at 
Key Stage 2 in Maths or English. We also keep the extra £1 billion of additional spending 
in an effort to reduce the number of schools facing large losses.  
The secondary FSM premium is set to be the same as the base amount provided in Key 
Stages 1 and 2. Since we are now allocating both an FSM premium and a low prior 
attainment premium to secondary schools, we make them both two-thirds of the primary 
FSM premium. The EAL and non-statemented SEN add-ons are, as before, set at 10% of 
the base amount for KS1 and KS2 pupils. It turns out that with a budget of just over  
£32 billion, the feasible payments are £2,360 for each KS1 or KS2 pupil, £3,070 for KS3 
pupils and £3,660 for KS4 pupils. On top of these amounts, primary schools receive an 
extra £3,540 for each FSM pupil. Secondary schools receive £2,360 for each pupil eligible 
for FSM and for each pupil with low prior KS2 attainment. Therefore, a pupil eligible for 
FSM who also happens to have low prior attainment will attract a total of £4,720 in 
additional funding. A premium of £240 is provided for pupils with EAL or non-
statemented SEN. 
Figure 4.24 shows the spread of winners and losers. There seems to be very little 
difference between primary and secondary schools – about 40% of both are net losers 
and about 10% experience large losses (of 10% or more). However, there is a difference 
in the proportions experiencing gains of 10% or more – 20% of primary schools but only 
13% of secondary schools.  
Figures 4.25 and 4.26 illustrate the changes in funding by decile group. Amongst primary 
schools, the policy is clearly progressive, with the most deprived primary schools gaining 
about 7% on average. The other deciles experience very small changes in their funding 
position, with the richest decile seeing a small income reduction on average.  
Figure 4.24. Cumulative distribution of gains and losses in 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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Figure 4.25. Decile chart for primary schools, 2008–09 
  
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
Figure 4.26. Decile chart for secondary schools, 2008–09 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
However, amongst secondary schools, the picture is different from what we have seen 
before. The most deprived schools gain about 4% on average, but the gains are actually 
slightly higher amongst the schools in the middle of the distribution, between the fourth 
and seventh deciles, while the most affluent secondaries are worse off by about 3%. It 
therefore seems as though the combination of the FSM and low KS2 premiums leads to an 
even wider spread of gains amongst secondary schools than either an FSM premium or a 
MOSAIC premium on its own. Whether this is desirable or not depends on the stated aims 
of the policy. We see here that a low KS2 premium would not be effective at redistributing 
financial resources to secondary schools with materially deprived pupils (even when 
combined with an FSM premium). It would, however, be an obvious lever to redirect 
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funding towards secondary schools whose pupils were low achievers at primary school, 
and can be thought of as redistributing away from schools with a high-ability intake to 
schools with a low-ability intake. As such, combining an FSM premium with a low KS2 
premium would be appealing if policymakers were interested in both sorts of 
redistribution together. 
Summary of options for a single national funding formula 
In this section, we have attempted to model the effects of implementing a single national 
school funding formula. Option 3a looked at a differentiated FSM premium under 
complete revenue neutrality. This scheme was progressive at both the primary and 
secondary levels; however, 10% of primary schools and 12% of secondaries experienced 
large losses (of 10% or more). We then attempted to model the policy proposed by Policy 
Exchange, with a MOSAIC premium and £1 billion of additional spending (option 3b). This 
policy was mostly progressive amongst primary schools, but led to losses amongst the 
most deprived secondary schools. Despite the additional spending, this option actually 
led to a greater number of primary and secondary schools experiencing large losses than 
under option 3a. The last option we considered allocated an FSM premium at primary 
level, with an FSM and low KS2 prior attainment premium at secondary schools. This 
reform was clearly progressive amongst primary schools, but actually led to the largest 
average gains amongst secondary schools with low to moderate levels of poverty. The 
addition of the low KS2 prior attainment premium seems to spread the gains from a pupil 
premium more widely. The proportion of secondary schools that experienced large losses 
was significantly reduced, but the number of primary schools experiencing similarly large 
losses was the same as under option 3a.  
Table 4.3 summarises all the options we have considered in this chapter. One conclusion 
from this analysis is that the number of significant losers from implementing a single 
national funding formula would be lower than the number losing significantly if only 
specific grants were replaced with a pupil premium. The price of simplicity in this 
seemingly radical option thus seems to be lower. This should not be surprising, as specific 
grants are received by all schools whereas a pupil premium would be focused on 
deprived schools.  
  Ta
bl
e 
4
.3
. S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 w
in
ne
rs
 a
nd
 lo
se
rs
: 
al
l o
pt
io
ns
 
P
o
lic
y 
o
p
ti
o
n 
(m
et
h
o
d
 o
f 
fu
n
d
in
g
) 
D
ep
ri
va
ti
o
n
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
E
xt
ra
 
co
st
 
(£
b
n)
 
N
et
 w
in
ne
rs
(%
) 
A
ve
ra
g
e 
ch
an
g
e
(%
) 
A
ve
ra
g
e 
ch
an
g
e 
fo
r 
m
o
st
 
d
ep
ri
ve
d
 s
ch
o
o
ls
 
(%
) 
Sc
h
o
o
ls
 w
it
h
 
la
rg
e 
lo
ss
es
 (
%
) 
Sc
h
o
o
ls
 w
it
h
 
la
rg
e 
g
ai
ns
 (
%
) 
 
 
P
ri
m
Se
c
P
ri
m
Se
c
P
ri
m
Se
c
P
ri
m
Se
c
P
ri
m
Se
c 
1
. 
In
 a
d
d
it
io
n 
to
 
cu
rr
en
t 
fu
nd
in
g
 
 
 
O
p
ti
o
n 
1
a
FS
M
2
.5
1
00
1
00
8
.3
6
.1
2
3
1
6
0
0
3
3
1
8 
O
p
ti
o
n 
1
b
FS
M
 (*
)
2
.5
1
00
1
00
1
0
.2
4
.1
2
8
1
0
0
0
4
0
4 
O
p
ti
o
n 
1
c
FS
M
, M
O
SA
IC
 (*
)
3
.5
10
0
1
00
13
.3
7
.3
32
14
0
0
50
28
 
 
 
 
2
. 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
fo
r 
sp
ec
if
ic
 g
ra
nt
s 
 
 
O
p
ti
o
n 
2
a
FS
M
0
3
0
4
3
–3
.6
0
.5
1
3
2
0
2
6
1
0
9
1
4 
O
p
ti
o
n 
2
b
M
O
SA
IC
1
4
6
4
0
4
.6
–0
.1
20
3
2
2
1
5
3
0
1
8 
 
 
 
3
. 
Si
ng
le
 n
a
ti
on
a
l 
fu
nd
in
g
 f
or
m
ul
a
 
 
 
O
p
ti
o
n 
3
a
FS
M
 (*
)
0
6
1
3
8
2
.6
–1
.5
8
5
1
0
1
2
2
1
7 
O
p
ti
o
n 
3
b
M
O
SA
IC
 (*
)
1
6
4
4
2
8
.9
–0
.2
1
2
–3
1
2
2
0
3
8
1
8 
O
p
ti
o
n 
3
c
FS
M
, l
o
w
 K
S2
 (*
)
1
6
0
5
9
2
.5
5
.1
4
7
1
0
8
2
1
1
3 
N
ot
es
: 
(*
) 
in
di
ca
te
s 
ad
di
ti
on
s 
fo
r 
E
A
L 
an
d 
no
n-
st
at
em
en
te
d 
SE
N
. A
ve
ra
ge
s 
ar
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 a
s 
ar
it
hm
et
ic
 m
ea
ns
 a
cr
os
s 
th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 g
ro
up
 o
f 
sc
ho
ol
s.
 ‘L
ar
ge
’ g
ai
ns
 a
nd
 lo
ss
es
 a
re
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
1
0
%
 o
r 
m
o
re
. 
The pupil premium: assessing the options 
72 
4.4 Moving to a single national funding formula 
The introduction of a single national funding formula would mark a significant reform to 
the system of school funding in England, as it would replace all LA-determined funding 
allocations with a completely centralised and transparent system. In the previous section, 
we showed three options for such a formula and the resulting changes in school finances. 
Although the exact proportions varied with each option, we showed that a non-negligible 
proportion of primary and secondary schools could experience large losses (and large 
gains) under a single national funding formula. Some of these gains and losses represent 
redistribution from relatively well-off schools to less well-off schools as a result of the 
greater weighting towards deprivation.  
In this section, we provide some supplementary analysis that breaks down the winners 
and losers from such a reform into more detail. For brevity’s sake, we only perform this 
analysis for one of the options we considered in the previous section. The option we have 
chosen to consider is 3a – the simplest of the three single national funding options – with 
a differentiated FSM premium across primary and secondary schools and no additional 
spending. Under this option, 10% of primary schools and 12% of secondary schools 
would experience large losses (10% or more). This section also considers transitional 
mechanisms and the potential costs of smooth transition. Finally, we list the unresolved 
issues relating to the introduction of a single national funding formula that we have been 
unable to consider.  
Profiles of winners and losers 
We have already considered the profile of winners and losers under a single national 
funding formula by a school-level measure of deprivation (see Figures 4.19 and 4.20). We 
have also seen that primary schools gain and secondary schools lose, on average, from 
this policy. It is important to note that this reflects the particular parameter values we 
have chosen; it is not inherent to a single national funding formula. We now consider the 
profile of winners and losers by other characteristics: school size and geography. 
By size of school 
Figure 4.27 illustrates the average gains and losses by size of school. Primary schools, on 
average, gain from this reform. The gains that they receive do not appear to be highly  
Figure 4.27. Winners and losers by size of school 
(a) Primary schools 
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(b) Secondary schools 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
differentiated by school size. Amongst secondary schools, it is clear that large secondary 
schools lose from such a policy and only the smallest ones would gain, on average.  
By region 
Figure 4.28 shows the average gains and losses across Government Office Regions. It 
shows that there are some differences between regions for primary schools, with those in 
the South West and South East gaining by over 5% and those in London and the North 
East gaining by less than 1%. But primary schools in Yorkshire and the Humber fare 
worst – they would actually be slightly worse off on average. However, the pattern is 
different for secondary schools: those in the North East and London are on average better 
off (albeit by less than 1%), whereas secondary schools across the rest of England are 
worse off on average. The largest losses for secondary schools are in the East Midlands 
and Yorkshire and the Humber. With the exception of Yorkshire and the Humber, there 
appears to be a negative relationship at the region level between the impact on primary 
schools and the impact on secondary schools. 
Figure 4.28. Winners and losers by region 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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By urban versus rural status 
Looking at schools in urban and rural local authorities separately (Figure 4.29), one 
observes little average difference between urban and rural secondary schools – both 
types lose around 1.5% on average. However, rural primary schools seem to gain more 
than urban primary schools. 
Figure 4.29. Winners and losers, urban versus rural  
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
By local authority 
Another important consideration is the spread of average gains across individual local 
authorities. Figure 4.30 illustrates the pattern of average gains and losses amongst 
primary (dark grey line) and secondary schools (light grey line) across LAs. In each case, 
we have ordered LAs from left to right, from those that lose the most to those that gain 
the most on average. As we already knew, primary schools gain on average more than 
secondary schools. However, it is now also clear that the average gains and losses are 
relatively spread out by local authority. Schools in some LAs lose by more than 5%, on 
average, whilst others gain by more than 5%. The variation by local authority is far more  
Figure 4.30. Winners and losers by local authority 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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spread out than that observed by region, school size or the urban/rural split. What is 
driving such variation?56 
We have used a single set of values to allocate funds to schools for pupils in each Key 
Stage, based on the average AWPU ratios currently used by LAs. However, there is 
naturally variation around these averages. Therefore primary schools in LAs that 
currently choose to prioritise primary school funding more than the national average will 
lose out under a single national funding formula, whilst secondary schools in these areas 
will tend to gain. Conversely, primary schools in areas that currently choose to prioritise 
secondary school funding more than the national average will gain from a single national 
funding formula, and secondary schools in these areas will lose on average. The pattern of 
gains and losses will thus partly result from local differences in the relative funding 
currently allocated to primary and secondary schools.  
Local authorities also differ in the level of spending they choose to hold centrally, leading 
to differences in the amounts delegated to schools. If no account is taken of such 
differences (as in our analysis), then a single national funding formula will naturally 
redistribute some funding from schools in LAs with low proportions of spending on 
central services to schools in LAs with high proportions spent on central services. 
Account would need to be taken of such differences if this is not the intended outcome of 
the policy. However, it is worth noting that some differences in the amounts held 
centrally result from differing practices for spending on pupils with high-cost special 
educational needs: some LAs choose to delegate most of such spending to schools, whilst 
some choose to spend the money centrally.  
Historical factors are also likely to drive some of the variation we observe across LAs. As 
we learnt in Chapter 2, the Minimum Funding Guarantee and spend-plus methodology 
have entrenched some historical differences in funding, which would be unwound in a 
single national funding formula. 
Lastly, some differences could also be driven by measurement error or differing 
accounting practices across LAs. We believe that the pattern of Figure 4.30 is a fair 
reflection of the likely pattern of average gains and losses that would result from a single 
national funding formula, i.e. quite spread out by local authority. However, measurement 
error and differing accounting practices could well be driving some of the extreme values 
we observe. We have thus chosen not to publish a list of how much local authorities win 
or lose. These differences are important, but they should only be considered in detail 
once any policymaker is confident that any significant measurement error has been 
removed.  
Impact on year-on-year volatility 
Another issue with a single national funding formula is that, by making school incomes 
depend more explicitly on pupil characteristics and pupil numbers, a school’s financial 
resources could fluctuate significantly from one year to the next as the student body 
evolves over time. Chowdry, Muriel and Sibieta (2008) showed that under the current 
system, this is unlikely to occur because of the role played by historical factors and the 
Minimum Funding Guarantee (MFG) in setting school allocations. While these might 
inhibit the potential for funding to follow the pupil, they also provide schools with a 
                                                                  
56Readers should note that, as we have retained the current Area Cost Adjustment, the schools that lose are 
not those that currently receive an uplift from this factor. 
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certain amount of stability. Under a pupil premium, there might be less stability 
(precisely because funding would follow the pupil explicitly). 
Figure 4.31 addresses this question by comparing the actual annual changes in funding 
per pupil that occurred between 2007–08 and 2008–09 (solid lines) with the change that 
would have occurred had the pupil premium in option 3a been in place in both years. This 
is done for primary schools (dark grey lines) and secondary schools (light grey lines) 
separately. Note that the small number of schools that experienced actual real-terms cuts 
under the baselines could either have lost some high-SEN funding, or have observed a fall 
in real-terms funding as a result of the outturn for inflation being higher than the cash 
MFG. 
The first point to note is that the solid and dashed dark grey lines coincide almost 
perfectly. This means that for primary schools, the same overall annual changes in 
income would have occurred under option 3a as had actually occurred between 2007–08 
and 2008–09. This does not mean that individual primary schools would have 
experienced the same changes in funding under a pupil premium as they experienced 
under the actual system. Rather, it means that, in the aggregate, the distribution of gains 
and losses from one year to the next would have been about the same under option 3a as 
the actual distribution of gains and losses (from 2007–08 to 2008–09).  
For secondary schools, there are small differences between the baseline volatility and 
counterfactual volatility. It appears that more secondary schools would actually have 
seen an annual increase in funding per pupil had option 3a been in operation, compared 
with the current system (73% versus 55%). Overall, there would have been a slightly 
lower degree of year-on-year volatility for secondary schools had option 3a been in place. 
Figure 4.31. Year-on-year volatility under the current system and under a 
pupil premium 
 
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
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Transitional mechanisms and costs 
Our analysis has shown that a non-negligible proportion of schools would experience 
large reductions in per-pupil funding (of 10% or more) under a number of options for a 
single national funding formula. At the same time, a number of schools would experience 
large increases in per-pupil funding (of 10% or more). The implementation of these 
changes in a single year would undoubtedly be destabilising. Schools experiencing large 
losses would need to suddenly cut back resources, whilst schools experiencing sudden 
and large gains may not be able to spend all the extra funds immediately in an efficient 
manner. Here, we consider transition mechanisms to move to a national funding formula 
over a period of time (instead of instantaneously) and we look at the costs of doing so. We 
again only consider option 3a from the modelling in Section 4.3.  
The most natural way to smooth the transition to a single national funding formula is to 
impose a limit on the maximum loss that schools can receive in any given year. This 
would effectively phase in a single national funding formula over a number of years 
rather than immediately. For instance, if a temporary floor of 5% is imposed, then no 
school can incur an annual loss of more than 5% of its real-terms funding per pupil; any 
school that would stand to lose more would receive some additional funding to limit its 
losses to 5% each year. As a result, schools that are potentially very significant losers 
from a pupil premium might instead lose 5% each year (for as many years as are 
necessary to arrive at their pupil premium allocation), enabling a smoother and more 
stable path of adjustment to the new system. 
We have examined this issue by modelling a range of floors from 3% to 10%. For each 
floor, we have calculated how many years it would take for at least 99% of schools to 
reach the level of funding per pupil that they would theoretically have under a single 
national funding formula. The target of getting 99%, rather than 100%, of schools to 
eventually be on the new funding system reflects the fact that a small number of schools 
may have particular funding circumstances for which our modelling cannot control. 
In such modelling, we assume no changes in school characteristics (for example, the 
proportion of pupils eligible for FSM) over time and no real increase in total school 
funding over time. The first of these assumptions simply reflects the fact that we do not 
know how school characteristics will change over time. We could have chosen to 
implement a single national funding formula in previous years and examined the changes 
over time. However, pupil numbers were falling up until 2008–09, but they are due to rise 
by just over 0.7% per year between 2010–11 and 2013–14 (Department for Children, 
Schools and Families, 2009b). The past experience of changes in school characteristics is 
thus not a fair reflection of likely changes in the coming years. We have chosen to assume 
a zero real increase in total school funding to reflect the necessary fiscal restraint in 
operation over the coming years, though such an assumption may well be overly-
generous if plans for departmental spending cuts are shared equally across 
departments.57 The government currently plans to increase ‘front-line’ school spending 
by 0.7% per year in real terms (HM Treasury, 2009, p. 104, para. 6.28), which will 
maintain real-terms ‘front-line’ school spending per pupil if the future increases in the 
pupil population materialise as expected.58 Our assumption of a zero real increase in 
school spending is thus equivalent to assuming that Labour’s current spending plans are  
                                                                  
57See Crawford, Emmerson and Tetlow (2010) for more information.  
58Authors’ calculations using Department for Children, Schools and Families (2009b). 
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Table 4.4. Possible durations and costs of transition 
Floor on losses 
in real-terms 
per-pupil 
spending 
Length of 
transition 
(years) 
Cumulative total cost of transition
(£m, 2010 prices) 
Without ceiling on 
increases in funding 
With ceiling of 
15% per year 
–3% 9 1,650 570
–4% 7 1,130 460
–5% 5 800 370
–6% 5 610 290
–7% 4 470 220
–8% 4 370 170
–9% 3 290 120
–10% 3 230 80
Notes: See Section 4.2 for data sources. All figures presented in 2010 prices. 
maintained going forwards, with the real increase in total spending used to maintain 
spending per pupil in real terms. 
Under these assumptions, the first column of Table 4.4 shows how long it would take for 
99% of schools to reach their counterfactual level of funding per pupil under a single 
national funding formula for different values of the floor (again, using option 3a from 
Section 4.3). Naturally, the smaller the floor (that is, the closer the floor is to zero), the 
more losses are deferred to future years. Thus, with a smaller floor, the transition is 
slower and it takes longer for 99% of schools to complete their adjustment. Under a real-
terms floor of 3% per year, it would take nine years to reach the formula (for 99% of 
schools), whereas it would only take three years under a floor of 10% per year. In 
between these, it would take five years to reach the new formula if schools were allowed 
to lose up to 5% of their funding per pupil annually. 
The next column of Table 4.4 shows the temporary, cumulative increase in school 
spending required to maintain a given floor over the years that it is required. For 
instance, imposing a floor of 5% per year would cost a total of £800 million spread over 
five years (or £160 million a year) in 2010 prices. Extra spending is required in order to 
limit cuts in individual schools’ budgets to 5%, instead of the larger cuts that the formula 
would imply.  
It is clear that some of these floors are quite expensive to implement, and could 
potentially require more than £1 billion in additional funding. In order to help fund these 
floors, one could also choose to implement a ceiling on annual increases in per-pupil 
funding. This might also be appealing if one believes that any large sudden increases in 
funding would not be spent efficiently by schools. Imposing a ceiling would have the 
effect of staging any large gains over time. The final column of Table 4.4 illustrates the net 
cost of imposing each floor while also imposing a ceiling of 15% per year. As can be seen, 
this significantly reduces the cumulative amount of additional funding that is required. 
For example, if one chose to implement a floor of 5% and a ceiling of 15% per year, then 
99% of schools would be on the new single national funding formula within five years of 
the reform, and the cost of such a transition would be a cumulative sum of £370 million 
over five years (or about £75 million a year) in 2010 prices. 
Finally, it is important to remember that such transitional mechanisms would not stop 
individual schools from losing large amounts; they would simply stage such losses over a 
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number of years. Furthermore, real-terms cuts in per-pupil spending of 5% per year 
would still be significant for any school experiencing such cuts; schools have become used 
to real-terms increases. The only way to reduce such losses is through a permanent 
increase in school funding.  
Unresolved issues 
There are a number of issues that our modelling has not resolved, but which it would be 
important to consider for any policymaker implementing a single national funding 
formula. The most important of these are listed below.  
• SEN funding – In our modelling, we have kept constant the level of funding for pupils 
with a statement of special educational needs. The system for funding such 
statements is currently governed by local authorities. If one were to implement a 
single national funding formula, one would need to either provide funds to LAs to 
maintain such a system or create a new body to administer such statements and 
funding. Our modelling has also ignored the funding of special schools, which would 
need to be accounted for in any single national funding formula. 
• Newly-opened schools – We have frozen the funding for all schools that are either 
newly or recently opened, since such schools currently have special arrangements to 
account for start-up, transitional and fixed costs. Any national funding formula would 
need to have similar arrangements, especially in a context where the setting-up of 
new schools was actively encouraged, as under current Conservative proposals.  
• Central services – Local authorities currently use about 10–15% of their Schools 
Budget to provide central services to pupils and schools, and most of these services 
would still need to be provided with a single national funding formula. Therefore, 
either funding would need to be provided to LAs to cover such provision or one 
would need to consider alternative arrangements. Furthermore, one anomaly in our 
modelling is that we currently penalise schools in LAs that spend small amounts on 
central services.  
• Area Cost Adjustment – One of the most important factors influencing the actual 
funding that LAs and schools currently receive is the Area Cost Adjustment (ACA). 
This factor aims to account for the differential costs of schools across the country, 
including the cost of hiring and retaining teachers and support staff. However, the 
current ACA has not been updated since at least 2005. The current review of the 
Dedicated Schools Grant aims to consider an adjustment to the ACA; one piece of 
research commissioned by the review considered the options for a replacement.59 
Therefore, it is clear that any policymakers considering a single national funding 
formula should also contemplate changing or updating the current ACA.  
• Loss of complexity – Finally, implementing a single national funding formula would 
restrict the ability of policymakers to consider local, school-specific or site-specific 
circumstances. For instance, it is difficult to imagine such a formula taking account of 
current funding for swimming pools or schools with split sites. Although a national 
formula would provide simplicity, it could clearly do so at the cost of local 
differentiation or perhaps a necessary amount of complexity.  
                                                                  
59See http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/management/schoolfunding/DSGformulareview/research/. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has set out our attempts to model the financial implications of a pupil 
premium. Doing so involved simulating a range of simple policy options and looking at 
their impact on both the population of schools as a whole and across various dimensions 
of school characteristics. Modelling these options has enabled us to scrutinise proposed 
policies on a much more elaborate level than has previously been attempted to inform the 
debate with objective empirical analysis.  
The policy options have been grouped together according to whether they supplement 
the existing funding system, replace specific grants or replace almost the entirety of the 
system. The options in the first category, which we have adjusted in order to approximate 
current Liberal Democrat policy, are the most financially generous to schools and 
increase progressivity. However, the funding for them must be found from other sources: 
the Liberal Democrats have proposed cutting tax credits to above-average-income 
families, as well as other areas of spending. These options also have the potential to add 
to the complexity of the current school funding system, rather than reducing it. The 
second group of options, one of which is revenue-neutral, might be a first attempt at 
implementing a pupil premium during a period of unprecedented fiscal restraint. 
However, we have seen that such policies, based on scrapping specific grants, have the 
potential to create a vast number of losers. Finally, the last group of options represent, in 
principle, the most radical sort of reform: scrapping both LA formula funding and specific 
grants. Such an approach is ambitious and speculative but might tempt a policymaker 
wishing to streamline and centralise the current system. This was the option proposed by 
Policy Exchange, and it is currently a long-term aspiration of the Conservative Party.  
Many key findings emerge from this analysis. First, there is a trade-off between the 
amount of coverage in a deprivation measure and the size of the premium that can be 
attached to it. Adding a new measure of deprivation, or moving to a broader measure, will 
clearly result in funding being spread more thinly across schools unless additional 
resources are committed. Second, specific grants are an important income source, 
particularly for secondary schools and schools with high levels of deprivation. Unless it is 
deemed acceptable to redistribute revenues away from these schools, compensation for 
schools that receive a large amount in specific grants would have to be implemented.  
When we consider the implementation of a single national funding formula, the number 
of significant losers would be lower than when replacing specific grants only. There is a 
lower cost to implementing such an option than one might have expected. This should not 
be surprising, as specific grants are allocated to all schools to some extent whereas a 
pupil premium would be focused on deprived schools. However, LA formula funding may 
well have intricacies that are designed to achieve a complex set of aims: replacing them 
with a simpler set of funding rules could have the potential to leave some schools 
significantly worse off, and any compensatory measures must be carefully worked out. 
Our more detailed analysis of a single national funding formula illustrated that one of the 
key problems with such a reform would be the concentration of gains and losses among 
particular local authorities. This pattern does not appear to follow an urban/rural split; 
instead, it is likely to reflect LAs’ current split in funding between primary and secondary 
schools, spending levels on central services, historical factors and measurement error or 
differing accounting practices.  
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Another concern might be the risk of higher annual volatility in school funding levels 
under a transparent national formula. Our analysis, however, has revealed that this is 
unlikely to be a large problem, especially for primary schools. Furthermore, we also 
illustrated that one could impose transitional mechanisms in moving to a national 
funding formula over time, which do not necessarily have to come at a high cost. For 
example, our simplest option (3a) could be phased in over five years at a temporary, 
transitional cost of £75 million per year (2010 prices), by implementing a 5% floor in the 
real-terms cuts any school could receive and a 15% ceiling on any increase. However, this 
would not remove the possibility of large losses; it would merely stage them over time. 
Moreover, real-terms cuts in per-pupil spending of 5% per year would still be significant 
for any school experiencing such cuts; schools have become used to real-terms increases. 
The only way to reduce such losses is through a permanent increase in school funding.  
In short, there are myriad potential ways of structuring a pupil premium, ranging from 
simple to elaborate. Parameters can be chosen to redistribute from secondary schools to 
primaries, or from rich schools to poor ones, or vice versa. To converge upon an optimal 
policy or a set of optimal policies is beyond the scope of this Commentary: doing so would 
necessarily involve a subjective judgement about whether certain schools receive 
insufficient funding or too much funding under the current system. Rather, the value of 
this chapter is in the greater understanding it provides of the implications at the micro 
level of various potential policy options. This understanding is crucial, and, as with all 
good policy design, is a necessary step towards minimising the risk of perverse or 
unintended consequences of any future reform. 
 
 82 
5. Conclusions 
Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have proposed the introduction of a 
pupil premium into the English school funding system, aiming to narrow the achievement 
gap between rich and poor by attaching greater levels of funding to pupils from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. In this Commentary, we have reviewed the theory behind 
the pupil premium, critically assessing the channels through which such a premium may 
affect the attainment of disadvantaged pupils. We have also empirically examined the 
options for a pupil premium, assessing their overall effect on the progressivity of the 
school funding system and the pattern of winners and losers that would result. This work 
has highlighted a number of key challenges and questions that any policymaker wanting 
to implement such a policy in the coming years must address.  
Our reading of the literature suggests that, at best, the pupil premium is likely to lead to a 
modest reduction in the attainment gap between rich and poor through the direct effect 
of extra resources. This policy will not, on its own, abolish the attainment gap, which is 
still likely to remain large afterwards, still likely to lead to inequalities in later life 
outcomes and still likely to be passed down through the generations. In order to 
significantly narrow the achievement gap, interventions must be wider than changes in 
school resources and must also go beyond schools policy. Socio-economic inequalities in 
educational outcomes are just as much, if not more, the result of differences in the home-
learning environment, parenting, attitudes to education and other factors. At the same 
time, it is vital that any wider policies be evidence-based, making use of robust evaluation 
techniques and careful analysis, especially in a tight fiscal environment. If a pupil 
premium truly reflects a desire to significantly reduce the attainment gap between rich 
and poor, then the first question to policymakers must be: ‘What else are you going to 
do?’. 
The next key question for policymakers is: ‘What source of educational disadvantage do 
you want to target?’. If it is only families in poverty or those with very low incomes, then 
eligibility for free school meals seems like a good measure to use in a pupil premium; this 
would also have the advantage of simplicity and is unlikely to create perverse incentives. 
However, one may feel that such a definition is too narrow and that the measure of 
educational disadvantage should be wider, incorporating attitudes and socio-cultural 
factors as well as material resources. In this case, one should strongly consider either 
using some measure such as MOSAIC linked to average attainment or using a direct 
measure of pupils’ performance at Key Stage 2. Such measures are likely to spread the 
benefits from a pupil premium more widely to schools with moderate levels of 
deprivation. Whether this is a good thing depends almost entirely on what sources of 
educational disadvantage the pupil premium aims to alleviate.  
The third key question for policymakers is: ‘How will the reform be funded?’. A pupil 
premium could be on top of the current system of school funding, as proposed by the 
Liberal Democrats; this option would clearly avoid any school losing its existing funding. 
Funding for such a scheme would need to be found from other sources: the Liberal 
Democrats have proposed cutting tax credits to above-average-income families, as well as 
other areas of spending. However, a pupil premium on top of the current system would 
not correct any existing flaws in the current system and could actually increase 
complexity. Moreover, given the level of fiscal restraint required in the coming years, it 
seems wise to consider alternative options that are either revenue-neutral or involve 
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smaller increases in additional spending. One alternative option might be to create a 
pupil premium through the abolition of specific grants from central government, 
streamlining them to form a pupil premium. This Commentary has shown that such a 
scheme would lead to a very large number of significant losers and cannot be seen as 
feasible, even with additional levels of spending. A more speculative option, as proposed 
by Policy Exchange and aspired to by the Conservatives, is the creation of a single 
national funding formula incorporating a pupil premium.  
Following on from this, the next key question is: ‘What level of losses for schools are you 
prepared to accept?’. The implementation of a very simple single national funding 
formula with no additional spending could lead to real-terms losses in excess of 10% for 
some schools. Such a redistribution of per-pupil funding could be undertaken as a gradual 
transition, however. It is possible to move to a new national funding formula over a 
period of five years with a 5% floor on the real-terms cuts that any school could receive in 
a given year (and a ceiling of 15%). This would come at a relatively low temporary cost of 
about £75 million per year. Nevertheless, such a mechanism would not avoid the need for 
large cuts in some schools; it would merely stage them over time. A 5% real-terms cut in 
per-pupil spending is still a significant reduction in per-pupil funding, especially if it is 
sustained over a number of years, which would have to be the case for some schools. The 
only way to avoid such losses is through a permanent increase in school spending.  
It is obvious that the questions of where the money will come from and what level of 
losses a policymaker is willing to accept cannot be separated. They are both vital 
questions, and the answer to each informs the answer to the other. Unfortunately, in the 
present tight fiscal environment, any policymaker wanting to implement a national 
funding formula will have little additional spending with which to compensate schools 
experiencing large losses and is likely to face significant protests from the schools seeing 
their funding cut. Our analysis also reveals that schools experiencing large losses may be 
clustered together in certain local authorities, which could easily create a concentrated 
political constituency opposed to such a policy. 
Finally, a single national funding formula would replace local discretion over school 
funding with a centrally-determined national formula. This would certainly increase 
transparency and reduce complexity. However, simplicity is a double-edged sword: it 
might restrict the ability of school funding decisions to respond to particular 
circumstances (for example, if a school has a swimming pool or a split site) or to reflect 
local preferences, and it would certainly reduce local accountability. Therefore, the 
penultimate question is: ‘Do you want to replace local discretion over funding with a 
simple, central formula?’. 
The pupil premium clearly has a noble aim: to narrow the achievement gap between rich 
and poor pupils. However, our analysis has shown that any revenue-neutral or low-net-
cost option is likely to lead to significant numbers of schools experiencing large losses in 
per-pupil funding. Minimising such losses with additional public spending is likely to 
prove difficult given the level of fiscal restraint required over the course of the next 
parliament. The last question facing a policymaker is therefore: ‘Do the likely gains from 
implementing a pupil premium – greater levels of funding for deprived schools, a modest 
reduction in the achievement gap between rich and poor pupils, as well as greater 
simplicity and transparency – outweigh the potential costs – loss of local discretion and 
significant levels of cuts to per-pupil funding across some schools?’. 
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 Appendix 
Regression results for 2008–09 
Table A.1. Total income, 2008–09 
 Primary Secondary 
Base per-pupil amount 2,401.258*** 3,446.109*** 
Extra amount per FSM pupil 2,462.912*** 3,366.849*** 
Extra amount per EAL pupil 391.013*** –31.072 
Extra amount per SEN pupil with statement 11,610.627*** 11,400.469*** 
Extra amount per SEN pupil without statement 509.890*** 492.086*** 
Extra amount per boarding pupil 3,039.880 777.950** 
Extra amount per nursery pupil 3,599.820*** n/a 
Extra amount for being a Voluntary Aided or 
Voluntary Controlled school 
–22,898.100*** –64,954.618*** 
Extra amount for having a sixth form n/a 158,168.740*** 
Extra amount per sixth-form pupil n/a 1,611.347*** 
Constant 165,830.889*** 351,239.942*** 
 
Number of observations 17,021 3,247 
Number of local authorities 149 148 
R-squared 0.94 0.95 
Mean income per pupil 3,900.73 4,864.12 
Median income per pupil 3,705.74 4,700.89 
EAL – English as an additional language; FSM – free school meals; SEN – special educational needs. 
** – significant at 5% level; *** – significant at 1% level. 
Table A.2. Formula income, 2008–09 
 Primary Secondary 
Base per-pupil amount 2,245.704*** 3,143.245*** 
Extra amount per FSM pupil 1,774.890*** 1,889.815*** 
Extra amount per EAL pupil 171.167*** –45.122 
Extra amount per SEN pupil with statement 10,329.351*** 8,906.645*** 
Extra amount per SEN pupil without statement 287.864*** 274.045*** 
Extra amount per boarding pupil 3,535.270 568.946*** 
Extra amount per nursery pupil 3,373.737*** n/a 
Extra amount for being a Voluntary Aided or 
Voluntary Controlled school 
–19,862.901*** –60,242.984*** 
Extra amount for having a sixth form n/a 148,335.799*** 
Extra amount per sixth-form pupil n/a 1,529.146*** 
Constant 124,416.000*** 214,533.402*** 
 
Number of observations 17,024 3,249 
Number of local authorities 149 148 
R-squared 0.95 0.97 
Mean income per pupil 3,317.08 4,093.84 
Median income per pupil 3,170.70 4,037.43 
EAL – English as an additional language; FSM – free school meals; SEN – special educational needs. 
** – significant at 5% level; *** – significant at 1% level. 
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